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Abstract: 
 
This study first provides detailed descriptive analyses on 45 specific audit deficiency allegations based on 
GAAS as detailed in AAERs and securities class action lawsuits over the violation years 1978-2015, and 
then uses these allegations to validate existing popular proxies of audit quality. Of all the audit quality 
proxies, we find that restatement fares the best as it consistently predicts all the top six most cited audit 
violations. Additionally, audit fees to total fees ratio and city specialist predict five of the most cited 
violations. Overall, our results suggest that the predictive power of audit quality proxies depends on the 
settings that researchers are interested in, and on the specific audit violations hypothesized to matter in the 
investigated setting. For example, for future studies related to auditor independence, we recommend the 
use of restatement and audit fees to total fees ratio as proxies of audit quality. 
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Measuring Audit Quality 
 
1. Introduction 
 A large body of research investigates the antecedents and consequences of poor audit 
quality.  Much of this research, as summarized by DeFond and Zhang (2014), relies on cross-
sectional or time series variation of the following three types of proxies to measure audit quality: 
(i) output-based audit quality measures (e.g., discretionary accruals), (ii) input-based audit quality 
measures (e.g., audit fees), and (iii) other audit quality measures.  These measures are relatively 
easy to compute from machine readable databases.  However, there is little evidence on the 
descriptive accuracy of these measures or on the construct validity of these proxies.  In this paper, 
we aim to achieve two objectives. First, we provide detailed descriptive analyses on how poor 
audits are perceived in both public and private litigation settings. Second, we evaluate how well 
existing audit quality proxies predict detailed allegations related to how auditors actually 
performed in specific engagements.  These allegations are hand-collected from the SEC’s 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and non-dismissed securities class 
action lawsuits filed against auditors (both audit firms and individual audit partners). 
 Any discussion of the proxies of audit quality has to grapple with the difficulty associated 
with defining audit quality.  The two most cited definitions of audit quality have been provided by 
(i) DeAngelo (1981), who defines audit quality as the joint probability that auditors both “discover 
a breach in the client’s accounting system, and report the breach;” and by (ii) DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) who define higher audit quality as “greater assurance of high financial reporting quality.”  
Survey evidence by Christensen et al. (2016) suggests that individual investors value auditor 
competence as indicative of high audit quality whereas audit professionals view compliance with 
audit standards as a sign of high audit quality.  Thus, DeAngelo (1981) seems to focus on the 
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auditor’s input into detection of errors whereas practitioners are concerned about compliance 
(Christensen et al., 2016).  DeFond and Zhang (2014)’s definition arguably incorporates both the 
auditor’s detection of errors and compliance with auditing standards.  
We believe that audit defects in specific engagements alleged by the SEC or private law 
firms are consistent with all the three definitions of audit quality in that (i) lawyers allege that 
auditors did not discover and/or report breaches in the client’s accounting system (the DeAngelo 
definition); (ii) such alleged defects are bound to affect high financial reporting quality (the 
DeFond and Zhang definition); and (iii) as a practical matter, allegations against auditors are 
framed by both the SEC and the class action lawyers in terms of violations of Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS), consistent with practitioners’ definition of audit quality (Christensen 
et al., 2016).  Our attempt to compile fine-grained data on audit quality is also consistent with calls 
by Donovan et al. (2014) to incorporate “the institutional features of the audit process into the 
definition of audit quality.” 
 We provide three sets of empirical analyses to evaluate how well the extant proxies capture 
actual audit deficiencies.  We begin with a detailed description of alleged deficiencies on audits of 
(i) 141 companies identified by the SEC over the years 1985-2016; and (ii) 153 companies 
identified as deficient by securities class action lawyers over the years 1996- 2016.  To eliminate 
frivolous allegations, we only focus on lawsuits that were not subsequently dismissed.  Because 
the rest of the lawsuits are invariably settled, we cannot ascertain whether these alleged 
deficiencies held up in a court of law.  Moreover, we cannot compare allegations in cases won or 
lost by the plaintiff given that all lawsuits are settled.  Of course, the sample of SEC's AAERs is 
less likely to suffer from this limitation.  Our sample is also subject to selection issues if the SEC 
is the less likely to pursue Big N auditors relative to the class action lawyers, who focus, almost 
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exclusively on the Big N.  Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe our evidence is interesting 
because it provides the first granular perspectives into audit quality deficiencies at the audit 
engagement level based on what the SEC and private lawyers actually do rather than relying on 
aggregate and arguably indirect measures of audit quality that researchers have been constrained 
to use to date. 
 Based on the GAAS framework for general, fieldwork, and reporting standards, we classify 
audit deficiencies into seven categories: (i) bogus audit; (ii) issues with engagement acceptance, 
(iii) violation of general standards; (iv) three specific violations of GAAS standards on fieldwork 
including, (a) deficiencies in audit planning; (b) insufficient competent evidence; and (c) 
understanding internal controls; and (v) a violation of the GAAS standard on reporting.  Within 
each of these broad categories, we identify 45 sub-categories of specific violations.  A framework 
based on violations of GAAS standards facilitates cross-sectional comparison of deficiencies 
across audit engagements. 
 An AAER or a lawsuit usually contains allegations of multiple deficiencies.  The six most 
commonly cited violations of GAAS standards, at the sub-category level, for AAERs and lawsuits 
combined, relate to (i) failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence (200 cases); (ii) failure 
to exercise due professional care (177 cases); (iii) failure to express an appropriate audit opinion 
(156 cases); (iv) inadequate planning and supervision (126 cases); (v) lack of independence from 
client (122 cases); and (vi) failure to obtain an understanding of internal control (106 cases).1   
After documenting the nature of the allegations in detail, we assess how well the extant 
proxies of audit quality predict the top six alleged violations individually. The difficulty of such 
task is to separate audit quality from financial reporting quality. We use litigations against auditors 
                                                 
1 See Appendix B for the most frequently cited audit deficiencies. 
4 
 
as our treatment sample, and litigations against managers and firms but not auditors as our control 
sample. Given that audit quality is unobservable, we believe our control sample serves as a good 
counterfactual because the control sample experienced poor financial quality but not audit quality. 
We find that restatement consistently and positively predicts each of the six alleged audit 
deficiencies. This finding indicates that restatements are associated with lower audit quality. Two 
input-based measures seem to also fare well. City specialist negatively predicts five out of the top 
six deficiencies, suggesting that city-specific industry specialists provide higher audit quality. 
Audit fees to total fees ratio negatively predict four out of the top six deficiencies. This indicates 
that higher audit fees ratio signals higher audit quality.  
Lastly, we include all audit quality measures in a combined regression to predict each of 
the top six alleged audit deficiencies in AAERs and lawsuits.  We find that restatement consistently 
predicts all of the top 6 most cited audit deficiencies. Audit fees to total fees ratio is negatively 
associated with five alleged audit violations.  The relation between audit fees and audit deficiencies 
is bi-directional.  On the one hand, if audit fees suggest the need for greater audit effort in the case 
of risky clients, we would expect a negative association between audit fees and alleged audit 
violations.  One the other hand, more fees could proxy for cover against expected litigation risk or 
even lack of independence, suggesting a positive association between audit fees and audit 
deficiencies.  The bi-directional nature of this proxy makes interpretation of empirical associations 
difficult and ambiguous.  Results in our study suggest that audit fees is more likely to be a proxy 
for auditor effort in litigation settings.  Additionally, city specialist is also negatively associated 
with five allegations. This suggests that city-specific industry specialists provide higher audit 
quality.  Contrary to our prediction, we observe that firms with small profits are less likely to 
violate all of the top six alleged audit violations. 
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Taken together, our results can be summarized as follows.  First, restatement seems to be 
the best audit quality proxy as it consistently predicts all top six most cited audit deficiencies.  
Second, the predictive power of audit quality proxies is violation and setting specific.  For example, 
if a researcher is interested in predicting evidence violation by auditors, he/she should consider 
using the discretionary accruals, restatement, Big N auditor, audit fees to total fees ratio, new client, 
or city specialist as audit quality proxies. If predicting independence violation is of interests, 
researchers should consider using restatement or audit fees to total fees ratio as audit quality 
proxies. If a researcher is interested in predicting internal control violation, the researcher should 
consider using restatement, audit fees to total fees ratio, discretionary accruals, industry specialist, 
or city specialist as audit quality proxies. 
 Our paper follows a long tradition of work designed to test the construct validity of 
machine-readable measures of earnings management (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 2011) or 
of litigation risk (Kim and Skinner 2011).  Our paper contributes to the literature in two important 
ways.  First, we provide comprehensive evidence on how poor audit quality is actually perceived 
at the field level.  St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) describe audit defects found in 129 lawsuits 
against accountants in the 60’s and 70’s but this classification predates much of GAAS.  Beasley 
et al. (1999, 2013), in separate reports commissioned by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA), 
and the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), respectively also report descriptive data on audit 
deficiencies identified by the SEC for 56 and 81 AAERs for the period 1987-1997 and 1998-2010.  
Our sample is more comprehensive in that we also cover 153 non-dismissed lawsuits against 
auditors over the period 1996-2016.  Moreover, there are substantial differences in the nature of 
deficiencies identified by the SEC when compared with the class action lawyers, as detailed later 
in the paper.   
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Second, unlike Beasley et al. (1999 and 2013), we evaluate whether widely used models 
of audit quality predict these detailed deficiencies.  This is an important task given the ubiquity of 
the standard proxies of audit quality in the literature.  In a recent paper Aobdia (2017) conducts a 
similar validation of audit quality proxies benchmarked against a proprietary list of poor quality 
audits identified by PCAOB inspections.  Our paper complements Aobdia’s (2017) work in that 
our findings are equally skeptical of the descriptive validity of audit quality proxies (except 
perhaps for restatements).  We differ from Aobdia (2017) in that (i) we rely on a publicly available, 
albeit smaller, data set of alleged audit defects covering a longer time period; (ii) we document 
associations between audit quality proxies and detailed allegations related to how the audit was 
potentially deficient; and (iii) we focus on validating audit quality proxies in litigation settings, 
covering both public and private lawsuits against auditors. 
 The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses previous research on audit 
quality and reports on the merits and costs of relying on SEC’s AAERs and lawsuits to identify 
audit quality deficiencies.  Section 3 presents our data.  Section 4 discusses the research design 
and audit quality proxies.  Section 5 reports the results, and section 6 concludes. 
2.0 Previous research and our setting 
2.1 Previous work on audit quality proxies 
 A large body of accounting research investigates the drivers and consequences of audit 
quality.  The more commonly used proxies for audit quality can be categorized into input-based 
proxies and output-based proxies (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  Output based measures typically 
cover (i) material restatements, preferably initiated by the auditor; and SEC AAERs; (ii) going 
concern opinions; (iii) financial reporting characteristics such as the use of signed or absolute 
discretionary accruals, the Dechow-Dichev (2002) measure of earnings quality or Basu’s timely 
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loss recognition measure (Basu 1997), or the firm’s tendency to meet or beat quarterly analyst 
consensus estimates of earnings; and finally (iv) perception based measures such as the earnings 
response coefficient, stock price reactions to auditor related events, and cost of capital measures.   
Input-based proxies refer to auditor-specific characteristics, and auditor fees.  The most 
popular measure for auditor-specific characteristics is auditor size, in particular, whether or not the 
company is audited by a Big N auditor (DeFond et al. 2014).  The intuition is that Big N auditors 
provide a higher quality audit.  Given their scale, Big N auditors have access to better resources 
related to technology, training, and facilities (Chaney et al. 2004; Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et 
al. 1999; Khurana and Raman 2004).  Big N auditors are thought to be more independent than 
smaller audit firms because they (i) suffer greater reputational risk should they be negligent; (ii) 
rely less on an individual client’s revenues and are hence less likely to be swayed by an individual 
client; and (iii) their larger revenue base exposes them to higher litigation risk (Palmrose 1988; 
Stice 1991; Bonner et al. 1998; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Koh et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 
2014).  However, the Big N variable is an indicator variable that lacks nuance because it is not an 
engagement specific measure. 
 Audit fees proxy for the level of effort the auditor puts into scrutinizing a client.  Fees 
capture both demand and supply factors associated with audits.  Some researchers have also used 
the proportion of audit fees to non-audit fees as a proxy for their independence (Frankel et al. 
2002).  However, audit fees are likely tainted by efficiency improvements, which may not directly 
capture audit quality improvements.  Moreover, oligopolistic premiums charged by the Big N may 
not directly translate to higher audit quality.  Abnormal audit fees can also serve as price protection 
for expected litigation risk (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2002) or even proxy for lack of independence 
(e.g., Kinney et al.2004). 
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  DeFond and Zhang (2014) summarize the pros and cons of each of these measures.  One 
of the significant challenges with these measures is the difficulty in disentangling audit quality 
from the innate characteristics of the firm and the firm’s reporting quality (Dichev et al. 2013).  
Material restatements and AAERs are great proxies because they directly speak to the quality of 
the audit process but these observations, while capturing egregious conduct, are almost, by 
definition, rare and also do not account for “within GAAP” manipulations of financial statements.  
Moreover, the absence of an AAER or a material restatement does not automatically imply higher 
audit quality as even the most carefully executed audit cannot guarantee detection of fraud.  Further, 
managerial and auditor incentives can lead to non-disclosure of identified misstatements 
(Srinivasan et al. 2015).  Going concern opinions are also direct measures of the auditor’s opinion 
about the financial statements but these are issued only in exceptional cases.  Financial reporting 
characteristics are easy to compute and capture an element of audit quality because financial 
reporting and audit quality are inextricably intertwined.  However, reporting characteristics are 
rife with measurement error and bias (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005; Dietrich, Muller, and 
Riedl 2007; Patatoukas and Thomas 2011; Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev 2013).  Perception based 
measures such as the earnings response coefficients can capture audit quality in more 
comprehensive and less error prone ways than financial reporting measures, but they are indirect 
measures of audit quality. 
 We focus on validating three sets of audit quality proxies that are commonly used in the 
literature:  output-based proxies, input-based proxies, and other proxies.  We describe each of the 
proxies in detail in section 4.  
2.2 Our setting 
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 We focus on SEC's AAERs and class action lawsuits against auditors to identify detailed 
data on deficiencies in the audit of particular firms.  As discussed by St. Pierre and Anderson 
(1984), both the SEC and class action lawyers come across signals or characteristics related to 
specific firms that alerts interested parties to search for material errors in the financial statements 
of that firm and the auditor’s role in either failing to discover or report these errors to investors.  
Our setting, comprising of AAERs and auditor lawsuits, has a number of advantages and 
disadvantages.  The SEC has the power to demand disclosure of non-public data from both auditors 
and companies via its enquiry process (SEC 2016).  Because the SEC is also concerned about 
losing support from the investing public and its political constituents (e.g., Weick 1969; Bealing 
1994; Zheng 2017), it is less likely to allege audit inadequacies unless it can establish guilt with a 
high degree of assurance.  The United States is unique among much of the developed world in that 
public enforcement of audits is supplemented by the possibility of private class action litigation 
against auditors.  That is, investors can use securities class action lawsuits to protect their rights 
and hold auditors accounTable 6or violations of securities laws resulting from negligent audits.  
However, in the litigation process, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish the defendant’s 
scienter (e.g., Alexander 1991).  Hence, some lawsuits against auditors are potentially frivolous.  
We minimize that possibility by deleting lawsuits that were eventually dismissed.  In general, the 
AAER sample, and to some extent the lawsuit sample, is less likely to suffer from Type I errors 
because the SEC and class action lawyers are more likely to have identified wrong-doing when it 
actually occurred. 
The other consideration that deserves discussion is the time period over which lawsuit data 
has been gathered: 1996 - 2016.  This period starts after the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).  Coffee (2002), in particular, has argued that PSLRA made it 
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more difficult for class action plaintiffs to sue public companies for accounting abuses.  Moreover, 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (1998) abolished state court class actions alleging 
securities fraud, increasing plaintiffs’ difficulty in suing public companies.  Difficulty in suing 
public companies for accounting violations automatically raises the bar for litigating against audit 
firms, who are a step removed from management, which presumably orchestrates frauds.  Hence, 
the allegations documented in the class action suits against auditors arguably represent (i) a lower 
bound on such cases, if these restrictions were not in force; and (ii) more egregious instances of 
auditor laxity while conducting audits. 
However, our setting suffers from some disadvantages as well.  First, there could be 
selection bias in cases identified by the SEC but any guidelines that the SEC follows in picking 
cases and how it implements those guidelines are not visible to a researcher.  Empirically though, 
the SEC is, if anything, less likely to pursue Big N audit firms (Kedia, Khan, and Rajgopal 2015).  
Moreover, most of the allegations leveled by the SEC are usually neither contested nor accepted 
by the audit firms as the cases are settled, not necessarily won, by the SEC.  Hence, we cannot 
assert that the SEC’s allegations are truly violations. 
Class action lawsuits are more likely to be filed against Big N auditors because they have 
deep pockets (e.g., Arthur Andersen et al. 1992).  Although we delete dismissed cases, the 
remaining cases against auditors almost never go to trial as they are settled out of court.  Hence, 
we can never observe whether the plaintiffs’ allegations would have withstood scrutiny during a 
trial.  Of course, one can argue that the auditors are not entirely blameless as they seek settlement 
rather than risk scrutiny of their audit procedures in a trial.   
Despite these limitations, we believe that audit deficiencies identified by the SEC and the 
class action lawyers provide a hitherto under-discussed perspective on granular deficiencies in 
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audit quality at the engagement level.  Hence, these deserve to be documented and analyzed.  
Furthermore, it is useful to ascertain how well the popular measures of audit quality in the literature 
line up with these granular deficiencies.  We now turn to that task. 
3.0 Data 
3.1 Sample selection 
 Our sample is drawn from two sources: SEC's AAERs and non-dismissed securities 
litigation against auditors.  We identify enforcement actions against auditors using the AAER 
dataset discussed in Dechow et al. (2011).  As reported in Table 1, we started with a total of 107 
AAERs from this dataset, which we supplement with 114 AAERs based on our own search of the 
SEC’s database.  We end up with 141 usable observations after eliminating (i) 38 AAERs that 
pertain to the auditor’s lack of registration with the PCAOB; (ii) 21 cases that were miscoded in 
the original dataset as cases against auditors; 2 (iii) 10 missing AAER files from the SEC’s website; 
(iv) 10 redundant cases; and (v) one AAER with insufficient details to enable coding audit 
deficiencies.  We download these 141 AAERs against auditors between 1985 and 2016 from the 
SEC’s website (http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml).  Although the detailed 
descriptive data on the allegations reported in Table 2 are based on these 141 AAERs, only a 
maximum of 65 AAERs, or the equivalent of 149 firm-years related to the violation period during 
which the faulty audit was conducted, are available for use in the regressions reported in Tables 2 
- 10.  The primary culprit is the unavailability of data related to several control variables on CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT. 
                                                 
2 Some of these cases were related to the company’s audit report but the SEC did not pursue the auditor directly.  
For example, in AAER 3063 (SEC VS China Holdings, Inc. and its CEO), the CEO forged the audit report and the 
auditor resigned.  The SEC sued the company and its CEO but it did not sue its auditor. 
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As reported in Table 1, we obtained 293 non-dismissed lawsuits against auditors from the 
ISS securities class action database.  We collected the lawsuit filings for all these cases to verify 
that the auditor was listed as a defendant.  To optimally allocate our effort related to data gathering 
and coding, we eliminated (i) 53 cases where the auditors were not listed as a defendant; 3 (ii) 33 
cases where the lawsuit complaint could not be found; (iii) 25 cases where the allegations were 
too vague to code; 4  (iv) 14 cases for which records could not be found on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT; (v) nine cases with the same issues as AAERs; and (vi) six cases involving 
privately traded firms.  This left us with 153 usable lawsuits comprising 390 firm-years 
representing the class period where faulty audits are alleged by the plaintiffs. 
We read each complaint in detail and manually coded every listed allegation against the 
auditor under seven broad categories of alleged deficiencies.  To define these categories, we rely 
on the GAAS framework for general, fieldwork, and reporting standards.  Reliance on GAAS 
facilitates cross-audit comparison of deficiencies and enables us to report comparable descriptive 
data for the sample.  More importantly, accusations related to the violation of GAAS are leveled 
by both the SEC and the plaintiff lawyers against the auditors. 
A brief description of these standards follows.  The general standards require that (i) the 
audit is to be performed by a person or persons with adequate technical training and proficiency 
as an auditor; (ii) in all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to 
be maintained by the auditor or auditors; (iii) due professional care is to be exercised in the 
                                                 
3 This could mean one of two things: (i) there could be data errors in the ISS database, or (ii) the lawsuit against the 
auditor could be filed separately.  Regardless, we exclude cases where auditor’s name does not appear on the 
complaint. 
 
4 When coding the audit deficiencies in lawsuits, we look for sections where the complaint lists all the audit standard 
violations for defendants.  Usually this section is named as “Defendant Auditor’s Violation of Auditing Standards” 
or something similar.  If this section is missing, we go through the entire document to look for alleged audit 
deficiencies.  Specifically, we look for terms such as “the auditor violated certain GAAS standard.”  We exclude 
cases where no concrete violations of auditing standards are alleged.  
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performance of the audit and the preparation of the report.  The standards of field work require 
that (i) the work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised; 
(ii) a sufficient understanding of internal control is to be obtained to plan the audit and to determine 
the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be performed; (iii) sufficient competent evidential matter 
is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a 
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under audit.  
The standards of reporting mandate that (i) the report shall state whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance with GAAP; (ii) the report shall identify those 
circumstances in which such principles have not been consistently observed in the current period 
in relation to the preceding period; (iii) informative disclosures in the financial statements are to 
be regarded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report; and (iv) the report shall 
contain either an expression of opinion regarding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an 
assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be expressed.  When an overall opinion cannot be 
expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated.  In all cases where an auditor’s name is 
associated with financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indication of the 
character of the auditor’s work, if any, and the degree of responsibility the auditor is taking. 
We classify audit deficiencies into seven categories by audit area: (i) bogus audit; (ii) issues 
with engagement acceptance, (iii) violation of GAAS; (iv) three specific violations of GAAS 
standard on fieldwork including (a) deficiencies in audit planning; (b) insufficient competent 
evidence; and (c) understanding internal controls; and (v) a violation of the GAAS standard on 
reporting.  These seven categories are catalogued as panels A-G in Table 2.  We identify 45 sub-
categories of fine grained deficiencies under each of these broad categories.  It is hard for us to 
comment on which of these violations is considered more severe.  We suspect that the importance 
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of specific violations is specific to the context and is unobservable to an empiricist from case 
documents. 
The data reveal substantial differences in the frequency with which the class action lawyers 
and the SEC cite violations of specific GAAS standards.  As indicated in panel H of Table 2, on 
average, plaintiff lawyers refer to the violation of about 14.6 GAAS standards and sub-standards 
per case relative to 4.8 violations cited by the SEC.  The difference in average number of cites of 
auditing standards between AAERs and lawsuits is statistically significant.  Panel I suggests that 
the lawyers are also more likely to cite other standards such as GAAP (2, violations on average, 
relative to one by the SEC).  The SEC found three bogus audits but the lawyers found none, as per 
panel A.  This is not surprising considering that the SEC tends to investigate audits by smaller 
accounting firms, unlike securities lawyers.  The lawyers are more likely to cite violations of sub-
standards relative to the SEC.  However, the SEC and the lawyers are equally likely to cite 
insufficient levels of professional skepticism (C4) and inadequate evaluation of entity’s going 
concern status (G1).  Because these data have not received a lot of academic attention, we turn to 
a somewhat detailed discussion of the more frequently cited deficiencies. 
3.2 Most frequently cited deficiencies 
In this section, we briefly discuss the ten most frequently observed categories of 
deficiencies in our data: (i) 200 instances of failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence 
(violation of the fieldwork standard, row E2 in Table 2); (ii) 177 cases of failure to exercise due 
professional care (violation of the general GAAS standard, row C3); (iii) 156 instances of failure 
to express an appropriate audit opinion (violation of the reporting standard, row G5); (iv) 126 
instances of inadequate planning and supervision (violation of the audit planning standard, row 
D1); (v) 122 cases of lack of independence from the client (violation of the general GAAS 
15 
 
standards, row C2); (vi) 106 instances of failure to obtain an understanding of internal control 
(violation of the fieldwork standard, row F2); (vii) 93 cases of insufficient level of professional 
skepticism (violation of general GAAS standard, row C4); (viii) 91 cases of failure to faithfully 
state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP (violation of the 
reporting standard, row G3); (ix) 70 cases of failure to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure 
(violation of the reporting standard, row G6); and (x) 67 cases of inadequate consideration of fraud 
risks (violation of the audit planning standard, row D3).  These instances are reviewed in detail in 
the following sub-sections. 
3.3 Failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence 
Several cases in this category accuse the auditor of relying too much on management’s 
representations without verifying the evidence underlying these representations.  Some cases 
allege that the auditor did not even obtain management representation before signing off on the 
audit report.  An illustrative example of the former type of allegation can be found in the lawsuit 
filed by class action lawyers of Worldcom’s shareholders against Arthur Andersen: “Andersen 
failed to obtain sufficient evidence in connection with WorldCom’s elimination or reduction of 
expenses through write-offs of reserves.  Instead, Andersen relied largely on management’s 
representations. As a result, during 1999 and 2000, approximately $1.2 billion of those reserves 
were written off directly to income without any conceptual basis under GAAP.  Andersen failed 
to discover that the adjustments were unsupported by documentation.  In particular, Andersen 
failed to determine whether non-reporting-system journal entries (i.e., those entries that come from 
sources other than WorldCom’s revenue, expense, cash receipts, cash disbursement and payroll 
accounting and reporting systems) were valid.  Either Andersen failed to review WorldCom’s 
general ledgers or failed to ask to see any post-closing journal entries, or recklessly disregarded 
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such journal entries made without support. For example, while discussing management’s 
aggressive accounting practices, Andersen documented the following note in its work papers: 
‘Manual Journal Entries How deep are we going? Surprise w[ith] look [at] journal entries.’ 
Anderson failed to examine the nature of these manual journal entries (In re Worldcom, Inc. 
Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, December 2, 2003, p. 
224).” 
3.4 Failure to exercise due professional care  
Most of the allegations in this category are about inadequate audit procedures despite 
knowledge of potential risks associated with the client.  For example, the SEC states, “PwC and 
Hirsch (the audit partner) identified a number of risk factors associated with the preparation of 
SmarTalk's financial statements.  Despite PwC's and Hirsch's awareness of numerous risks and 
other information that could materially impact the financial statements, PwC and Hirsch failed to 
perform sufficient audit procedures to assess properly whether SmarTalk's accounting for and 
charges against its restructuring reserves was in conformity with GAAP.  As a result, SmarTalk 
improperly established a non-GAAP restructuring reserve and, as described above, misused it to 
materially inflate earnings before one-time charges at year-end 1997 (AAER 1787,  2003).”  
The SEC alleges in the matter related to the Gemstar's audit that “KPMG did not have in 
place a policy that required consultation with the Department of Professional Practice regarding 
all significant issues that had come to the attention of the engagement.”  They go on to assert, 
“With respect to the AOL revenue, Wong, Palbaum, Hori, (the partners) and KPMG unreasonably 
failed to exercise professional care and skepticism in reviewing the AOL IPG agreement and in 
testing Gemstar's representations regarding the purpose of the upfront nonrefundable fee (AAER 
2125,  2004).”  
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3.5 Failure to express an appropriate audit opinion  
 Most of the allegations in this category relate to the auditor issuing an unqualified opinion 
on the financial statements despite alleged knowledge of the fraudulent accounting policies or 
schemes used.  For instance, in the lawsuit against Seitel securities (In re Seitel, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, December 6, 2002, p. 58), the lawyers 
allege, “E&Y's published audit opinion ,which represented that Seitel's 2000 financial statements 
were presented in conformity with GAAP, was materially false and misleading because E&Y knew 
or was reckless in not knowing that Seitel's 2000 financial statements violated the principles of 
fair reporting and GAAP.”  Similarly, in the case against Andersen related to Global Crossing (In 
re Global Crossing LTD. Securities Litigation, Second Amandede Complaint, U.S. District Court, 
Southern District of New York, March 22, 2004, p. 331), the lawyers allege, “Andersen's failure 
to qualify, modify or disclaim issuing its audit opinions on Global Crossing's 1998, 1999, and 2000 
financial statements, or Asia Global Crossing's 2000 financial statements, when it knew or 
deliberately turned a blind eye to numerous facts that showed that those financial statements were 
materially false and misleading.” 
3.6 Inadequate planning and supervision 
 As the title suggests, this category relates to deficient audit plans.  In the SEC’s AAER 
no.1452, the SEC alleges, “For the fiscal 1994 and 1995 audits conducted by Wilkinson, there is 
a complete lack of documentation of any planning and no written audit programs.  For the fiscal 
1996 to 1998 audits conducted by Boettger and reviewed by Wilkinson (partner), audit planning 
documents and checklists were often incomplete, undated and unsigned.  Supervision of the audits 
was inadequate and included little partner involvement.  For the fiscal 1998 audit, a staff 
accountant conducted the audit at Madera's Miami headquarters while his supervisor, an audit 
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manager, remained at Harlan & Boettger's San Diego office.  Boettger permitted the audit manager 
to supervise the audit by telephone (AAER 1452,  2001)."  
In the case against Nicor, the lawyers allege, “Nicor's switch to the PBR plan was a new 
audit area that presented Andersen with a high degree of audit risk and it needed to focus on this 
area with an audit strategy characterized by, among other things, heightened professional 
skepticism and expanded audit procedures designed to obtain more persuasive evidence that 
Nicor's financial statements were not materially misstated.  Such procedures would include careful 
investigation of the third-party contracts Nicor was relying upon to justify the LIFO decrements, 
the substantial December 1999 "sales" which inflated earnings in 2000, and the impossibly high 
volume of infield transfers in 2000 (In re Nicor, Inc. Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, 
Northern District of Illinois, February 14, 2003, p. 80).” 
3.7 Lack of independence 
These allegations relate to the absence of an independent mental attitude of the auditor in 
dealing with the client.  For instance in the Global Crossing case, the lawyers allege, “because of 
significant non-audit related fees paid by Global Crossing and the hiring of Andersen's former 
senior partner in charge of the Telecommunications Practice in the Firm and lead partner on the 
Global Crossing engagement as the Senior Vice President of Finance at Global Crossing in May 
2000, Andersen lacked the requisite independence when Andersen audited the Company's 
financial statements (In re Global Crossing LTD. Securities Litigation, Second Amandede 
Complaint, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, March 22, 2004, p. 331).”  
Similarly in the matter of AaiPharma, the lawyers allege, “E&Y participated in the wrongdoing 
alleged herein in order to retain AaiPharma as a client and to protect the fees it received from 
AaiPharma. E&Y enjoyed a lucrative, long-standing business relationship with AaiPharma' s 
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senior management for which it received $4.7 million dollars in fees for auditing, consulting, tax 
and due diligence services for 2002-2003.  These fees were particularly important to the partners 
in E&Y's Raleigh office as their incomes were dependent on the continued business from 
AaiPharma (In re AaiPharma Inc. Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of 
North Carolina, February 11, 2005, p. 101).” 
3.8 Failure to obtain an understanding of internal control 
These allegations typically deal with the auditor’s negligence in appreciating the deficient 
internal control systems of the firm which potentially led to the alleged accounting fraud.  For 
instance, the lawyers state the following in the case related to Cellstar: “although KPMG Peat 
Marwick was retained by the Company to address deficient internal control problems at the same 
time that it was auditing the Company's financial statements for the year ended November 30, 
1995, KPMG Peat Marwick recklessly failed to enhance the scope of its audit so as to uncover 
Defendants' fraudulent scheme (State of Wisconsin Investment Board, et al. v. Goldfield, et al., 
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, p. 23).”  Similarly, in the matter of Informix, the 
lawyers allege, “Informix had weak internal controls.  E&Y knew that Informix's tiny internal 
audit department that performed no procedures to ensure revenue was recognized properly but 
primarily audited customer accounts as to license use.  Informix's weak internal controls made it 
possible for the defendants to recognize revenue on shipments made after quarter end (In re 
Informix, Corp. Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, April 6, 
1998, p.42).” 
3.9 Insufficient level of professional skepticism 
Exercise of professional skepticism requires auditors to demonstrate a questioning mind 
and to critically assess audit evidence.  In the Worldcom case, the lawyers allege, “Specific 
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examples of failing to exercise due professional case include: (i) given the poor state of the 
telecommunications industry in 2000 and 2001, Andersen failed to use professional skepticism in 
evaluating WorldCom’s ability to continue to meet aggressive revenue growth targets and maintain 
a 42% line cost expense-to-revenue ratio; and (ii) during 2000, WorldCom employees reported to 
Andersen audit team that WorldCom’s European operation reversed $33.6M in line costs accruals 
after the close of the first quarter of 2000 and as a result they were under-accrued. This top-side 
entry was directed by WorldCom’s U.S. management, and the U.K. employees did not have 
supporting documentation for it. Andersen failed to request and receive supporting documentation 
for this reduction and failed to exercise due professional care in evaluating the accrual (In re 
Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 
December 2, 2003, p. 224).”   
In the matter of Hollinger Inc, the lawyers allege, “KPMG was required to exercise 
professional skepticism, an attitude that includes a questioning mind, including an increased 
recognition of the need to corroborate management representations and explanations concerning 
mutual matters. Here, KPMG completely failed in its duties by issuing ‘clean’ or unqualified 
opinions in connection with its deficient audits and reviews of Hollinger’s financial statements (In 
re Hollinger International, Inc, Securities Litigation, U.S. District Court, Northern District of 
Illinois, p. 151).” 
3.10 Failure to faithfully state whether financial statements are in accordance with GAAP 
In the class action lawsuit involving Microstrategy, the lawyers allege, “PWC violated 
GAAS Standard of Reporting No. 1 which requires the audit report to state whether the financial 
statements are presented in accordance with GAAP.  PWC's audit reports falsely represented that 
MicroStrategy's fiscal 1997, 1998 and 1999 financial statements were presented in accordance 
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with GAAP when they were not for the reasons stated herein (In re MicroStrategy Inc. Securities 
Litigation,U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, p. 33).”  In AAER no. 2238, the SEC 
alleges, “the Respondents did not heed sufficiently indications that Just for Feet may have been 
improperly recognizing income through the acquisition of vendor display booths and failed to 
consider that this would mean that the financial statements did not conform to GAAP (AAER 2238, 
2005).” 
3.11 Failure to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure  
GAAS requires the auditor to determine whether informative disclosures are reasonably 
adequate, and if not, the auditor must state so in the auditor's report (AU 431.01).  Allegations in 
this category pertain to the auditor’s failure to assess whether the client should have disclosed 
material information in its financial statements.  For instance, in the case of KPMG and Xerox, the 
SEC in its AAER no. 2234, stated, “KPMG also failed to assess adequately (or require Xerox to 
assess) the need to disclose in the MD&A or financial statements the nature of and the impacts 
from these accounting actions, which materially deviated from the company’s historical 
accounting and financial reporting and accelerated $2.8 billion of equipment revenues and $659 
million in pre-tax earnings that otherwise would not have been recorded under GAAP (AAER 
2234,  2005).” 
In the case of PWC and Arthocare, the class action lawyers allege, “ArthroCare's financial 
statement disclosures were inadequate and, therefore, PwC violated GAAS by not modifying its 
previously issued unqualified audit opinions for the inadequacy of the information disclosed. The 
inadequate disclosures involved basic fundamental concepts such as revenue recognition, 
acquisition accounting and impairment analysis (In re Arthrocare Corp. Securities Litigation, U.S. 
District Court, Western District of Texas, December 18, 2009, p. 275).” 
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3.12 Inadequate consideration of fraud risks  
In the matter of Hanover, lawyers allege, “under AU §316, consideration of fraud in a 
financial statement audit, PWC was required to consider and plan for factors that indicated 
Hanover may be dealing with entities that were not independent. The risk factors under AU 
§316.17 included: (i) significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close 
to year end, that pose difficult "substance over form" questions; (ii) overly complex organizational 
structure involving numerous or unusual legal entities, managerial lines of authority, or contractual 
arrangements without apparent business purpose; (iii) difficulty in determining the organization or 
individual(s) that control(s) the entity; and (iv) unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially 
compared with that of other companies in the same industry (Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation 
Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, et al. v. Hangover Compressor Company, et al., U.S. District Court, 
Southern District of Texas, October 4, 2004, p.37).”  
Similarly, in SEC’s AAER 2815, the SEC alleges, “Putnam received indications of possible 
fraud at Ebix including earnings management, high involvement in accounting decisions by non-
financial management, commitments made to analysts, the expectation of possible equity funding, 
the desire to maintain a high stock price, Ebix’s very aggressive accounting policies, and possible 
opinion shopping by Ebix among accounting firms, among others. In particular, Putnam became 
aware that Ebix’s management had taken an extremely aggressive approach to recognizing revenue 
from the company’s software sales (AAER 2815,  2008).”  
In the following sections, we evaluate whether the extant proxies for audit quality that are 
widely used in the literature reflect the economic content of these allegations. 
4.0 Research design and audit quality proxies 
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 We use the following logistic regression to estimate whether an audit quality measure is 
associated with any specific audit deficiency violation:  
Prob (audit violation) = f (audit quality measure, controls)    (1) 
where the dependent variable equals 1 if an auditor allegedly violates one of the top six most 
frequently cited audit violations in AAERs or lawsuits, and zero otherwise.  This regression is run 
for each of the audit violation.  The top six most frequently cited audit deficiencies are presented 
in Appendix 2: (i) failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence; (ii) failure to exercise due 
professional care; (iii) failure to express an appropriate audit opinion; (iv) inadequate planning and 
supervision; (v) lack of independence from the client; and the (vi) failure to obtain an 
understanding of internal control. 
 We run model (1) using a treatment and control sample defined as the following. We 
construct our treatment sample as firm-years with securities class action lawsuits or AAERs 
against auditors. We define our control sample as firm-years with class action lawsuits or AAERs, 
but these lawsuits or AAERs are not against auditors. We believe that our control sample provides 
a good counterfactual with financial misconducts that were not related to auditors. 
We validate 16 commonly-used audit quality measures.  Following DeFond and Zhang 
(2014), we further categorize them into two groups: (1) output-based measures of audit quality, 
and (2) input-based and other measures of audit quality.  
Output-based measures of audit quality include DA, AbsDA, Total Accruals, Rstmt, 
SmlProfit, SmlBeat, and GC. Discretionary accruals, DA, is a commonly used measure of audit 
quality.  We estimate DA using the cross-sectional modified Jones model, following prior literature 
(e.g., Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2010; DeFond and 
Zhang 2014).  We subtract the derived non-discretionary accruals from accruals to obtain signed 
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discretionary accruals.  AbsDA is the absolute value of DA.  Total accruals, Total Accruals, is 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items minus net cash flow from operations excluding 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  As suggested by prior literature that 
discretionary accruals and total accruals are negatively associated with audit quality (e.g., Becker 
et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999), we expect that firms with higher DA, AbsDA, or Total Accruals 
are more likely to receive audit deficiency violations.  
  Rstmt is an indicator variable that equals one if the financial statements for the year are 
restated (e.g., Lobo and Zhao 2013).  We expect that auditors are more likely to violate auditing 
standards if their clients restate the financial statement (i.e., a positive coefficient on Rstmt).  
SmlProfit is an indicator variable if the ROA (income before extraordinary items deflated by 
beginning assets) is less than 3%.  SmlBeat is an indicator variable that equals one if the year-over-
year change in ROA is less than 1%.  Following the literature using the propensity to meet/beat 
earnings target as a measure of audit quality (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009), we expect that SmlProfit 
and SmlBeat positively predict the alleged audit deficiencies.  Going concern opinion, GC, is 
another indicator variable that equals one if the auditor issued a going concern opinion, per Audit 
Analytics.  Because going concern opinions signal low audit quality, we anticipate a positive 
coefficient for GC. 
 Our input-based and other measures of audit quality are BigN, Audit Fee Ratio, Audit Fee 
City Ratio, Tenure, New Client, Top 20 City, Auditor Firm Diff, City Specialist, and Industry 
Specialist. The most popular measure for auditor-specific characteristics is auditor size, in 
particular, whether or not the company is audited by a Big N auditor (DeFond et al. 2014). The 
intuition is that Big N auditors provide higher quality audit. Given their scale, Big N auditors have 
access to better resources related to technology, training, and facilities (Chaney et al. 2004; 
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Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 1999; Khurana and Raman 2004). Big N auditors are thought 
to be more independent than smaller audit firms because they (i) suffer greater reputational risk 
should they be negligent; (ii) rely less on an individual client’s revenues and are hence less likely 
to be swayed by an individual client; and (iii) their larger revenue base exposes them to higher 
litigation risk (Palmrose 1988; Stice 1991; Bonner et al. 1998; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Koh 
et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014).  However, the Big N variable is an indicator variable without 
much nuance because it is not an engagement specific measure. Based on existing literature, we 
expect Big N auditors are less likely to experience audit deficiency allegations (i.e., a negative 
coefficient on BigN). 
A stream of literature uses audit fees related proxies to measure the auditor-client relation 
and auditor’s litigation risk (e.g., Chaney et al. 2004; Dao et al. 2012; Francis et al. 2005; Fung et 
al. 2012; Gul and Goodwin 2010;  Seetharaman et al. 2002).  Audit Fee Ratio is audit fees divided 
by the sum of audit fees and non-audit fees for a given firm-year. Multiple forces can jointly 
determine audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980). One stream of auditing literature views the audit fees to 
total fees ratio as a proxy for auditor’s independence.  The larger the ratio, the more independent 
the auditor (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004; Francis and Ke 2006).  On the other 
hand, a few studies found no results using audit fees to total fees ratio as proxy for audit quality 
(e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; DeFond et al. 2002).  Therefore, we also make no directional 
prediction on Audit Fee Ratio.  
Audit Fee City Ratio is measured as a firm's audit fees divided by the aggregated amount 
of audit fees charged by the firm's auditor in the firm's headquartered city.  Essentially Audit Fee 
City Ratio measures the importance of a client for an audit firm in a city.  As suggested by the 
theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981), we expect that auditors have higher incentives 
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to compromise their independence and conform to client’s requests when conducting audits for 
more important client (i.e., a positive coefficient on Audit Fee City Ratio).  
We use two input-based measures to capture auditor-client relationships.  They are Tenure 
and New Client.  Tenure is the length in year of the auditor-firm relation.  Extant research shows 
conflicting results when investigating the relations between auditor tenure and audit quality.  On 
one hand, some research shows that auditor tenure is associated with higher audit quality (e.g., 
Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003).  On the other hand, Davis, 
Soo, and Trompeter (2009) find that longer auditor tenure can be associated with deteriorated audit 
quality.  Following prior literature suggesting that longer auditor-firm relation can reduce auditor’s 
independence from the client (e.g., Davis et al. 2009), we anticipate that Tenure will be positively 
associated with audit deficiencies.  
New Client is an indicator variable which signals whether or not the auditor-firm 
relationship is in its first year.  Following the literature suggesting longer auditor tenure improves 
audit quality and financial reporting quality (e.g., Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 
2002; Myers et al. 2003), one can expect that the newly establish auditor-client relationship may 
lead to deteriorated audit quality, as it takes time for the auditor to learn about its client’s business 
operation.  Alternatively, a firm’s new auditor mays put in more effort into the audit to avoid 
potential litigation risk in the first year audit of the firm.  Given the conflicting arguments on the 
first-year auditor-client relationship, we make no directional prediction on New Client. 
Motivated by a recent stream of literature focusing on the city level characteristics of 
auditors (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), we create the following 3 city level 
measures.  Top 20 City is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm's headquarter city is 
one of the largest 20 cities in the U.S. If the firm’s headquartered city is the same city as its 
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auditor’s office, then the indicator variable, Auditor Firm Diff, takes the value of one.  We use City 
Specialist to measure the auditor’s office size in a city, following Francis and Yu (2009).  City 
Specialist equals one if a firm’s auditor has the largest market share in terms of aggregated audit 
fees in an industry within that city in a given year. Since larger offices provide higher quality audits, 
we expect City Specialist to be negatively associated with audit deficiencies. Lastly, we create an 
indicator variable, Industry Specialist, which equals one if equals to one if the auditor satisfies one 
of the two following definitions (following Reichelt and Wang, 2010): (1) an auditor is a city 
industry specialist if it has the largest annual market share in an industry, based on the two-digit 
SIC code, and if its annual market share is at least 10 percentage points greater than its closest 
competitor in a city audit market; or (2) if an auditor has an annual market share greater than 50% 
in an industry, based on the two-digit SIC code in the city audit market. 
Similar to prior literature (e.g., DeFond and Zhang 2014), we control for Big N auditor 
(Big4), size (LogAT), leverage (Leverage), the presence of a reported loss (Loss), the firm’s asset 
turnover (AssetTurnover), book-to-market ratio (B2M), return on assets (ROA), growth 
(SalesGrow), the firm’s age (Age), and firms with December fiscal year-end (December).  Big4 is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s auditor is one of the big N auditor.  LogAT is the 
natural log of the firm’s total assets.  Leverage is total liability divided by total assets.  We create 
an indicator variable, Loss, to signal negative income.  AssetTurnover is measured as sales divided 
by total assets. B2M is a firm’s book-to-market ratio at fiscal year-end.  Return on assets, ROA, is 
net income before taxes and extraordinary items divided by total assets.  SalesGrow is the year-
on-year sales growth of the firm.  Age measures the length of data history for a firm in Compustat 
annual file.  We also include an indicator variable, December, which equals to one if the firm’s 
fiscal year ends in December. 
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5.0 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regressions in Table 4. 
Due to data availability, sample size varies for specific regressions.  For example, there are 344 
treatment observations and 3935 control observations in accrual quality related regressions (i.e., 
regressions (1), (2), and (3) in Panel A of Table 4).  The sample size drops to 246 treatment 
observations and 2552 control observations for audit fees related regressions (i.e., regressions (2), 
and (3) in Panel B of Table 4) because most audit fees related variables in Audit Analytics become 
available after 2000.  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 shows that treatment sample has higher 
signed and absolute value discretionary accruals (DA and AbsDA), while total accruals are similar. 
Additionally, treatment sample has higher restatement rates (Rstmt), lower loss number of loss 
firms (Loss), higher market-to-book ratio (M2B), lower ROA (ROA), and slower growth rate 
(SalesGrow). The auditors for firms in the treatment sample are less likely to be Big N auditor 
(BigN) and less likely to be industry specialist (Industry Specialist) in comparison to auditors for 
firms in the control sample. Interestingly, only about 3% of the treatment sample received going 
concern opinion, which is lower than the percentage of firms in the control sample that received 
going concern opinion (5%).  This low rate is consistent with observations in prior literature. 
5.2 Predicting sufficient competent audit evidence allegation 
 Table 4 presents the results of predicting the sufficient competent audit evidence allegation.  
Out of the seven output-based audit quality measures in Panel A, DA, AbsDA, and Rstmt load 
positively and significantly. These results suggest that firm years with higher discretionary 
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accruals (both signed and unsigned) and restatements are more likely to be associated with alleged 
evidence violation. In Panel B, we present the results for input-based and other measures of audit 
quality.  The coefficient of BigN is negative and significant (-0.864), which suggest that Big N 
auditors are less likely to experience the audit evidence allegation.  This is consistent with prior 
research finding that Big N auditors provide better audit quality in comparison to non-Big N 
auditors.  Audit Fee City Ratio has a positive and significant coefficient (1.059), consistent with 
our expectation. This finding indicates that auditors are more likely to experience evidence 
allegation and compromise audit quality when conducting audits for more important clients. 
Perhaps auditor’s independence can be compromised when auditing more important clients. Lastly, 
the negative and significant coefficient of City Specialist (-0.463) in Panel B indicates that if the 
auditor has the largest market share in a city, then its clients are less likely to experience evidence 
violation. This is consistent with research finding that larger audit offices provide higher audit 
quality (Francis and Yu, 2009).    
5.3 Predicting the due professional care allegation 
 Table 5 reports the results of predicting due professional care allegation. Similarly, DA, 
AbsDA, and Rstmt are positively associated with due professional care allegation, per Panel A of 
Table 5.  Consistent with our expectation, BigN in Column (1) of Panel B is negatively and 
significantly associated with due professional care allegation.  This result suggests that Big N 
auditors are associated with lower likelihood of due professional care violation, consistent with 
prior observations that Big N auditors provide higher audit quality (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2011). 
The coefficient of Audit Fee City Ratio is positive and marginally significant, which suggests that 
auditors are more likely to experience due professional care when auditing more important clients. 
The negative and significant coefficient of City Specialist (-0.746) indicates that auditors with the 
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largest market share in a city are less likely to violate due professional care standard. Perhaps these 
auditors care more about their reputation and provide better audit quality. 
5.4 Predicting failure to express an appropriate audit opinion allegation   
 Consistent with our expectation that higher discretionary accruals signal lower audit quality, 
DA and AbsDA in Panel A of Table 6 are positively and significantly associated with the allegation 
that the auditor failed to express an appropriate audit opinion (coefficients of 0.087 and 0.077 in 
Columns (1) and (2)). The positive and significant coefficient of Rstmt (1.064) suggests that firm 
years with restatements are more likely to be associated with appropriate audit opinion violation. 
 Turning to Panel B of Table 6, Audit Fee Ratio has a negative and marginally significant 
coefficient of -0.721. This suggests that higher audit fees to total fees ratio is correlated with lower 
likelihood of appropriate audit opinion violation. The negative and significant coefficient for City 
Specialist implies that city-specific industry specialists are less likely to experience appropriate 
audit opinion violation, as they provide higher audit quality. 
5.5 Predicting inadequate planning and supervision allegation   
 Table 7 reports the results predicting inadequate planning and supervision allegation.  In 
Panel A, Rstmt loads positively and significantly, implying that firms with restated financial 
statements are more likely to experience inadequate planning and supervision violation. 
 Big N has a negative and significant coefficient (-1.104) in Panel B. This implies that Big 
N auditors are less likely to experience inadequate planning and supervision violation. The 
negative and significant coefficient of Audit Fee Ratio (-0.755) suggests that higher audit fees to 
total fees ratio is associated with lower likelihood that the auditor will experience the inadequate 
planning and supervision allegation.  This is consistent with prior research on audit fees ratio 
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suggesting that lower audit fees in proportion to total fees is associated with lower audit quality, 
as auditor’s independence may be impaired (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004).  
 Audit Fee City Ratio has a statistically significant coefficient of 1.456, suggesting that 
auditors are more likely to have inadequate planning and supervision violation for more important 
clients. The coefficient for City Specialist (-0.624) in Column (8) of Panel B implies that larger 
auditor offices are associated with lower likelihood of inadequate planning and supervision 
violation. Lastly, the positive coefficient of Top 20 City suggests that firms in the Top 20 largest 
U.S. cities are more likely to experience inadequate planning and supervision problem.  
5.6 Predicting independence allegation   
 Table 8 includes the results predicting independence violation. In Panel A, Rstmt has a 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.714, suggesting that firm-years with restatements are more 
likely to be associated with the independence violation. In Panel B, Audit Fee Ratio has a negative 
and significant ratio of -1.296, indicating that higher audit fees to total fees ratio is associated with 
lower likelihood of independence violation. This is consistent with prior findings that higher audit 
fees to total ratios indicate higher audit quality (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004).   
5.7 Predicting inadequate understanding of internal control allegation 
 Results in Panel A of Table 9 suggests that Rstmt predicts internal control allegation 
positively.  The negative and significant coefficient of Audit Fee Ratio in Column (2) of Panel B 
suggests that higher audit fees to total fees ratio are correlated with lower likelihood of internal 
control violation.  City Specialist in Column (8) of Panel B has a negative and significant 
coefficient (-0.565). This finding suggest that city-specific industry specialists provide better 
internal control quality in audits.  
 5.8 Combined Regressions 
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 Table 10 presents the results from the combined regression analyses, where we include all 
the audit quality measures on the right-hand-side in equation (1) with all the control variables in 
place. Out of all the audit quality proxies, Rstmt is positively and significantly associated with all 
six audit deficiencies. This is consistent with our expectation that firms with restatements are 
associated with lower audit quality. SmlProfit loads negatively and significantly in all six 
regressions, suggesting that less profitable firms are less likely to violate these auditing standards.  
This result, however, contradicts our expectation based on prior literature.  Perhaps auditors for 
the less profitable firms are more aware of the potential litigation risks.  Therefore, the auditors 
put more effort into the audit to reduce the litigation risks.  
 Audit Fee Ratio negatively predicts five violations, suggesting that lower audit fees to total 
fees ratio is associated with higher likelihood of these five audit deficiencies. Existing literature 
presents mixed results using audit fees to total fees ratio as a proxy for audit quality. For example, 
Frankel et al. (2002) find that non-audit fees are positively associated with small earnings surprises 
and the magnitude of discretionary accruals; whereas Ashbaugh et al. 2003, and Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) find non-audit fees are not associated with the incidence of higher discretionary 
accruals. Out results contribute to the debate by showing that audit fees to total fees ratio proxies 
for audit quality in litigation settings. Additionally, City Specialist is negatively and significantly 
associated with five violations, which suggests that city-specific industry specialists provide higher 
audit quality (e.g., Reichelt and Wang, 2010). 
 DA has positive and significant coefficients in four out of six regressions. This indicates 
that firms with higher discretionary accruals are associated with higher likelihood of Evidence, 
DueCare, Opinion, and IntControl violations. BigN is negatively correlated with Evidence, 
DueCare, and Plan, suggesting that Big N auditors are less likely to experience those violations. 
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These findings are consistent with prior literature finding Big N auditors providing higher audit 
quality (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2011).  Audit Fee City Ratio positively predicts Evidence, Opinion, 
and Plan violations. These findings suggest that auditors are more likely to experience Evidence, 
Opinion, or Plan allegation when conducting audits for more important clients in relation to other 
clients in the city. These findings also indicate that auditor’s independence can be compromised 
when auditing more important clients. New Client negatively predicts three out of six audit 
violations. This suggests that if the auditor-client relation is in its first year, the auditor is less likely 
to experience violations of Evidence, DueCare, Plan and Indep. New auditors may be putting more 
effort into the first-year audit to reduce the potential litigation risk associated with the audit.  
Industry Specialist is marginally and positively associated with Evidence and IntControl 
violations.  These results imply that industry specialists are marginally more likely to violate these 
two auditing standards. Moreover, Tenure negatively predicts Plan violation; and Top 20 City 
positively predicts Plan violation. 
We report area under the curve (AUC) as a measure of goodness of fit and predictive power 
of our models. AUC usually is between 0.5 and 1, which represents a variation between random 
models and perfectly predictive models. For example, regression (6) in Table 10 includes all audit 
quality proxies and control variables, and has an AUC of 0.803. We exclude audit quality proxies 
and use only control variables to re-run regression (6). In untabulated results, we find the AUC is 
0.601. Including audit quality measures increases AUC from 0.601 to 0.803. This change of 0.202 
is significant at 1% in an untabulated chi-square test. This also suggests that all audit quality 
measures have an incremental explanatory power of 40.4%, which is economically considerable.5  
5.9 Robustness Check: Entropy Balancing  
                                                 
5 Calculation: (0.803-0.601)/(1-0.5)*100%=40.4%. 
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 One concern of our methodology could be covariate imbalance across treatment and 
control samples (i.e., differences in observables as shown in control variables). To address 
covariate imbalancing, we adopt the entropy balancing method (Hainmeller 2012). As shown in 
Panels A and B of Table 11, the means of the observables (i.e., control variables) become 
statistically indifferent after entropy balancing. This suggest that control variables are well 
balanced between treatment and control samples. We re-run all the regressions in Table 10 using 
the entropy balanced sample. Results remain similar. For example, Rstmt, SmlProfit, and City 
Specialist remain best predictors for all six violations. 
5.10 Robustness Check: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
 One concern of our research design is that individual allegations may not be independent 
from each other. Therefore, predicting individual allegations in separate logistic regressions may 
not account for the correlations among the allegations. To address this issue, we predict the top six 
most cited allegations jointly using seemingly unrelated regressions by including all the audit 
quality proxies and controls as independent variables. Seemingly unrelated regressions account for 
the correlations among individual allegations by assuming the error terms in each regression are 
correlated (Zellner 1962). Table 12 presents results using seemingly unrelated regressions. Results 
in Table 12 are consistent with our main results in Table 10.  
6.0 Conclusions 
 We provide evidence on the validity of output-based, input-base, and other proxies of audit 
quality that are commonly used in extant audit research.  Our empirical strategy relies on 
identifying specific complaints related to the audits identified in SEC’s AAERs and securities class 
action lawsuits filed against auditors over the violation years 1978-2015.  Assuming these 
complaints drafted by the SEC and private lawyers capture fine-grained data on deficiencies in the 
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audit process, we examine the associations between audit quality proxies and the top six most cited 
audit deficiencies in AAERs and lawsuits.   
We find that out of all the audit quality proxies validated in this study, restatement (Rstmt) 
is on the only proxy that consistently predicts all of the top six most cited audit violations.  
Additionally, audit fees to total fees ratio (Audit Fee Ratio) and city specialist (City Specialist) 
performs the second best and are predictive of five out of the top six audit violations. These results 
are consistent with prior research suggesting that higher audit fees to total fees ratio indicates 
higher audit quality (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004), and that city-specific industry 
specialists provide higher audit quality (e.g., Reichelt and Wang 2010).  Discretionary accruals 
(DA) is predictive of four out of the top six violations. Big N auditor (BigN), client importance in 
a city (Audit Fee City Ratio) and auditor-firm relationship (New Client) are predictive of three out 
of the top six violations.  Auditor’s industry specialty (Industry Specialist) is predictive of two 
violations. Auditor tenure (Tenure) and top cities (Top 20 City) are predictive of one violation.  
Collectively, our findings suggest that the use of audit quality proxies is violation and 
setting specific.  We suggest researchers choose audit quality proxies based on the specific 
violations.  For example, for auditor independence related studies, we recommend audit fees to 
total fees ratio (Audit Fee Ratio) and restatement (Rstmt) as proxies of audit quality.  For internal 
control related studies, we recommend restatement (Rstmt), audit fees to total fees ratio (Audit Fee 
Ratio), discretionary accruals (DA), industry specialist (Industry Specialist), and city-specific 
industry specialists (City Specialist) as proxies of audit quality. 
 We hope future work will focus its energy on refining these audit quality proxies or 
persuade the audit industry or the PCAOB to allow access to finer data such as anonymized work 
papers in an audit to further our understanding of what drives audit quality. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Test Variables (Audit Quality Measures): 
DA 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using modified Jones model with 
intercept. 
AbsDA The absolute value of DA. 
Total Accruals 
Absolute value of total accruals deflated by beginning assets. Total accruals 
are defined as income before extraordinary items less cash flow from 
operations, excluding extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  
Rstmt 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the financial statements for the 
alleged audit-deficient firm-year was restated, and zero otherwise. 
SmlProfit 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the ROA (income before 
extraordinary items deflated by beginning assets) is less than 3%. 
SmlBeat 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the year-on-year change in ROA 
(income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning assets) is less than 
1%. 
GC 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the auditor issued a going concern 
opinion. 
BigN 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the audit firm is a Big 4/6/8 firm, 
and zero otherwise. 
Audit Fee Ratio 
Audit fee ratio is audit fees divided by the sum of audit fees and non-audit 
fees for a given firm-year. 
Audit Fee City Ratio 
Audit fee city ratio is a firm's audit fees divided by the aggregated amount of 
audit fees charged by the firm's auditor in the firm's headquarter city. 
Tenure The length in year of the auditor-firm relationship. 
New Client 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the auditor-firm relationship is in 
its first year, and zero otherwise. 
Top 20 City 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm's headquarter city is one of 
the largest 20 cities in the U.S. 
Auditor Firm Diff 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm's headquarter city is the 
same city as its auditor's office, and zero otherwise. 
City Specialist 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an office is the number one auditor 
in terms of aggregated client audit fees in an industry within that city in a 
given year, and zero otherwise. 
Industry Specialist 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the auditor satisfies one of the two 
following definitions. Definition 1: an auditor is a city industry specialist if it 
has the largest annual market share in an industry, based on the two-digit SIC 
code, and if its annual market share is at least 10 percentage points greater 
than its closest competitor in a city audit market. Definition 2: An auditor is a 
city industry specialist if it has an annual market share greater than 50% in an 
industry, based on the two-digit SIC code in the city audit market.  
  
Control Variables: 
LogAT Natural log of the firm's total assets. 
   
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Loss 
An indicator variable that equals to one if a firm's net income is negative, and 
zero otherwise. 
AssetTurnover Sales divided by total assets, from Compustat. 
B2M Book-to-market ratio. 
ROA 
Return on assets is calculated as net income before taxes and extraordinary 
items divided by total assets. 
SalesGrow Year-on-year sales growth of the firm.  
Age Firm age is measured as the length of data history in Compustat annual file 
December 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm's fiscal year ends in 
December, and zero otherwise 
Segments Number of non-missing segments from COMPUSTAT segment data set. 
  
Dependent Variables: 
Evidence 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence," and zero 
otherwise. 
DueCare 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "failure to exercise due professional care," and zero otherwise. 
Opinion 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "failure to express an appropriate audit opinion," and zero 
otherwise. 
Plan 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "inadequate planning and supervision," and zero otherwise. 
Indep 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "lack of independence from client," and zero otherwise. 
IntControl 
An indicator variable that equals to one if an auditor experienced the 
allegation of "failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence," and zero 
otherwise. 
   
Appendix B: Top 10 Cited Audit Deficiencies 
Rank Frequency Allegations 
1 200 Failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence 
2 177 Failure to exercise due professional care 
3 156 Failure to express an appropriate audit opinion 
4 126 Inadequate planning and supervision 
5 122 Lack of independence from client 
6 106 Failure to obtain an understanding of internal control or over-reliance on internal 
controls (over-relying/failing to react to known control weaknesses) 
7 93 Insufficient level of professional skepticism 
8 91 Fail to faithfully state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance 
with GAAP 
9 70 Failure to evaluate adequacy of disclosure 
10 67 Inadequate consideration of fraud risks 
   
Table 1: Sample Description 
AAERs   Class Action Securities Litigations 
AAERs against auditors from Berkeley Data Set 107  # of litigations against auditors in the ISS database 293 
Additional hand-collected AAERs against auditors 114  Subtract:   
Subtract:     Allegations are too vague to code (25) 
 Missing AAER files (10)   Incomplete complaints or no complaints (33) 
 PCAOB registration matters (38)   Auditors are not included in the complaints (53) 
 Not against auditors (21)   Privately traded firms (6) 
 Allegations are too vague to code (1)   No records in CRSP and/or Compustat (14) 
 Redundant issues (10)   Same cases as AAERs (9) 
 # of AAERs coded 141    # of Lawsuits coded 153 
       
Subtract:    Translates to:  
 No records in CRSP and/or Compustat (52)   # of firm-years identified in CRSP and Compustat 390 
 Bogus Audit (3)     
 No issuer information (21)     
 # of distinct AAERs in final sample 65     
       
Translates to:      
  
# of firm-years identified in CRSP and 
Compustat 149         
   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Deficiencies Allegations  
  
Allegations AAER 
(N=141) 
Lawsuits 
(N=153) 
Significance 
Level 
Panel A: Bogus Audit 3 0 *      
 
Panel B: Engagement Acceptance    
B1 Failure to conduct adequate predecessor/successor 
communications 
6 1 ** 
B2 Inadequate assessment/consideration of management's integrity 1 2       
 
Panel C: General GAAS Standards    
C1 Inadequate training and proficiency to conduct engagement 11 37 *** 
C2 Lack of independence from client 46 76 *** 
C3 Failure to exercise due professional care 63 114 *** 
C4 Insufficient level of professional skepticism 42 51  
C5 Former audit employee serves in client management role 
(CEO/CFO) 1 2       
 
Panel D: Audit Planning -- Fieldwork GAAS Standard    
D1 Inadequate planning and supervision 36 90 *** 
D2 Failure to adequately address audit risk and materiality 15 32 ** 
D3 Inadequate consideration of fraud risks 12 55 *** 
D4 Failure to address illegal acts by clients 7 10  
D5 Failure to recognize/ensure disclosure of key related parties 13 23  
D6 Failure to appropriately design audit programs 8 13  
D7 Inadequate performance of analytical procedures 5 4  
D8 Inadequate review of engagement 9 1 ***      
 
Panel E: Sufficient Competent Evidence -- Fieldwork GAAS 
Standard    
E1 Failure to adequately perform audit procedures in response to 
assessed risks 
13 12 . 
E2 Failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence 75 125 *** 
E3 Inadequate performance of substantive analytical procedures 6 15 * 
E4 Inappropriate confirmation procedures 18 20 
 
E5 Inadequate observation of inventories 8 11 
 
E6 Failure to adequately audit derivative instruments, hedging 
activities, and investments in securities 
4 9 
 
E7 Failure to obtain adequate evidence related to management 
representations 
35 30 
 
E8 Over-reliance on/failure to obtain work of specialists 4 1 
 
E9 Inadequately considering responses from clients legal counsel / 
attorney letters 
3 3 * 
E10 Inadequate preparation and maintenance of audit documentations 30 2 *** 
E11 Failure to appropriately audit accounting estimates 8 17 * 
E12 Incorrect sampling techniques (failing to project results to 
population) 
0 1 
 
E13 Intentional alteration and/or destruction of workpapers 4 1 
 
   
  
Allegations AAER 
(N=141) 
Lawsuits 
(N=153) 
Significance 
Level 
Panel F: Understanding Internal Controls -- Fieldwork GAAS 
Standard    
F1 Failure to obtain an understanding of the entity and its 
environment 2 19 *** 
F2 Failure to obtain an understanding of internal control 9 97 *** 
F3 Over-reliance on internal controls (over-relying/failing to 
react to known control weaknesses) 2 8 * 
F4 Failure to consider particular risks related to the control 
environment 3 21 *** 
F5 Failure to communicate internal control related matters 
identified in an audit 1 3       
 
Panel G: Reporting GAAS Standards    
G1 Inadequate evaluation of entity’s going concern status 5 10  
G2 Failure to adequately communicate with the audit committee 7 15  
G3 Fail to faithfully state whether the financial statements are 
presented in accordance with GAAP 5 86 *** 
G4 Incorrect/inconsistent interpretation or application of 
requirements of GAAP 17 36 ** 
G5 Failure to express an appropriate audit opinion 48 108 *** 
G6 Failure to evaluate adequacy of disclosure 11 59 *** 
G7 Failure to appropriately reference the work performed by 
other auditors 1 0  
G8 Inappropriate consideration of material subsequent events 4 4  
G9 Inadequate evaluation of impact of uncertainties 1 5  
G10 Failure to report changes in accounting principle 1 3  
G11 Failure to evaluate known audit differences / improperly 
concluding that passed audit adjustments were immaterial 2 3  
G12 Inadequate reviews of quarterly/interim financial statement 
information 9 14       
 
Panel H: Average number of cites of auditing standards 4.8 14.6 +++      
 
Panel I: Average number of cites of non-auditing standards (e.g. 
GAAP rules) 1.5 2.0 + 
Note: This table presents the distribution of audit deficiency allegations for all the AAERs and securities class 
action lawsuits coded. In Panels A through G, we report the aggregate amount of allegations. For example, for 
allegation B1, 6 out of the 141 AAERs and 1 out of the 153 lawsuits stated “failure to conduct adequate 
predecessor/successor communication” allegation against auditors. In Panel H, we report the average number of 
cites of auditing standards in an AAER or securities class action lawsuit. In Panel I, we report the average 
number of cites of non-auditing standards (such as GAAP rules). For continuous variables, +, ++, +++ represent 
p-value at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level for two-sided t-tests. For discrete dichotomous variables, *, **, *** represent 
p-value at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level for two-sided chi-square tests. 
 
 
   
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in Table 4. Sample size varies by regression specification. Treatment sample is defined as 
firm-years with securities class action lawsuits or AAERs against auditors. Control sample is defined as firm-years with securities class action lawsuits 
or AAERs, but these lawsuits or AAERs are not against auditors. There are 4279 observations (344 observations in the treatment sample and 3935 
observations in the control sample) used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) in Panel A of Table 4, where accrual-based audit quality measures are variables 
of interest. The sample size increases to 5019 in regressions (4), (5), and (6) in Panel A of Table 4, and regressions (1), (4), (5) and (9) in Panel B of 
Table 4. The sample size decreases to 3252 for regression (7) in Panel A and 3236 for regressions (6), (7), and (8) in Panel B of Table 4 due to data 
availability for variables going concern and auditor city. The same size further reduces to 2798 in regressions (2) and (3) in Panel B of Table 4 due to 
availability of audit fees related variables. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
  Treatment Sample   Control Sample 
AQ Measures N Min Median Max SD Mean  N Min Median Max SD Mean 
DA 344 -2.923 0.019 58.997 3.217 0.249  3935 -21.305 0.010 13.774 0.895 0.046 
AbsDA 344 0.001 0.114 58.997 3.198 0.427  3935 0.000 0.104 21.305 0.851 0.280 
Total Accruals 344 0.000 0.066 5.168 0.363 0.165  3935 0.000 0.066 147.708 2.368 0.164 
Rstmt 420 0 1 1 0.497 0.564  4599 0 0 1 0.480 0.359 
SmlProfit 420 0 0 1 0.356 0.148  4599 0 0 1 0.347 0.140 
SmlBeat 420 0 1 1 0.483 0.631  4599 0 1 1 0.469 0.672 
GC 283 0 0 1 0.174 0.031  2969 0 0 1 0.217 0.050 
BigN 420 0 1 1 0.452 0.715  4599 0 1 1 0.346 0.861 
Audit Fee Ratio 246 0.086 0.705 1 0.272 0.663  2552 0.021 0.692 1 0.257 0.654 
Audit Fee City Ratio 246 0.001 0.078 1 0.300 0.214  2552 0 0.043 1 0.195 0.122 
Tenure 420 1 6 32 6.595 7.573  4599 1 5 39 6.597 7.347 
New Client 420 0 0 1 0.310 0.108  4599 0 0 1 0.314 0.111 
Top 20 City 282 0 0 1 0.405 0.206  2954 0 0 1 0.407 0.210 
Auditor Firm Diff 282 0 0 1 0.419 0.226  2954 0 0 1 0.429 0.242 
City Specialist 282 0 0 1 0.453 0.288  2954 0 0 1 0.493 0.422 
Industry Specialist 420 0 0 1 0.495 0.573   4599 0 0 1 0.497 0.550 
Control Variables                           
LogAT 344 -1.238 6.372 12.248 2.521 6.391  3935 -1.245 6.012 12.460 2.146 6.197 
Leverage 344 0.026 0.486 3.870 0.327 0.501  3935 0.013 0.475 28.870 0.673 0.518 
Loss 344 0 0 1 0.460 0.302  3935 0 0 1 0.496 0.433 
AssetTurnover 344 0.014 0.724 3.859 0.684 0.920  3935 0.000 0.832 15.961 0.833 1.001 
M2B 344 -10.131 3.073 80.699 7.179 4.922  3935 -876.945 2.554 1174.300 37.046 4.302 
ROA 344 -61.197 0.039 0.503 3.334 -0.235  3935 -53.572 0.016 0.695 1.079 -0.138 
SalesGrow 344 -0.896 0.226 31.779 1.935 0.530  3935 -1.000 0.155 1062.448 17.782 0.864 
Age 344 3 20 68 17.407 23.953  3935 2 20 68 16.537 24.133 
December 344 0 1 1 0.478 0.648  3935 0 1 1 0.484 0.624 
Segments 344 1 1 8 1.475 2.084   3935 1 1 10 1.447 1.979 
   
Table 4: Sufficient Competent Audit Evidence Allegation 
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"failure to gather sufficient competent audit evidence." Each column shows the regression results for a different 
audit quality measure, AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for 
output-based measures of audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures 
of audit quality. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. 
Associated p-values are reported using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Panel A: Output-based measures of audit quality      
DV: Sufficient 
competent audit 
evidence allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.001 0.928*** -0.074 0.051 -0.309 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.008] [0.166] [0.206] [0.122] [0.518] 
LogAT 0.049 0.05 0.047 0.03 0.03 0.026 -0.053 
 [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.069] 
Leverage -0.094 -0.097 -0.097 -0.024 -0.028 -0.032 -0.051 
 [0.086] [0.084] [0.086] [0.074] [0.076] [0.077] [0.075] 
Loss -0.771*** -0.780*** -0.783*** -0.801*** -0.809*** -0.795*** -0.968*** 
 [0.185] [0.185] [0.185] [0.166] [0.181] [0.177] [0.216] 
AssetTurnover -0.144 -0.147 -0.133 -0.2 -0.166 -0.161 -0.358** 
 [0.136] [0.135] [0.133] [0.143] [0.132] [0.132] [0.159] 
M2B 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ROA -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.067** -0.063** -0.062** -0.058* 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] 
SalesGrow -0.02 -0.018 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.010] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.002] 
Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
December -0.073 -0.077 -0.067 -0.018 -0.086 -0.084 -0.151 
 [0.221] [0.221] [0.221] [0.211] [0.207] [0.207] [0.240] 
Segments 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.032 0.046 0.044 0.019 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.061] [0.058] [0.058] [0.075] 
Constant -2.329*** -2.340*** -2.328*** -2.699*** -2.275*** -2.303*** -1.270** 
 [0.483] [0.484] [0.480] [0.428] [0.411] [0.405] [0.518] 
        
Total Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
# of Treatment Obs. 344 344 344 420 420 420 283 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.609 0.607 0.607 0.673 0.614 0.614 0.633 
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.047 0.020 0.020 0.030 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality      
DV: Sufficient 
competent audit 
evidence allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit 
Fee Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -0.864*** -0.425 1.059** 0.009 -0.086 0.237 0.088 -0.463** -0.15 
 [0.258] [0.367] [0.486] [0.017] [0.213] [0.284] [0.286] [0.208] [0.203] 
LogAT 0.088 -0.111 -0.096 0.024 0.027 -0.059 -0.054 -0.035 -0.049 
 [0.056] [0.078] [0.074] [0.056] [0.056] [0.068] [0.069] [0.068] [0.069] 
Leverage -0.045 0.378 0.327 -0.032 -0.033 -0.062 -0.059 -0.047 -0.06 
 [0.077] [0.259] [0.264] [0.077] [0.078] [0.075] [0.075] [0.074] [0.075] 
Loss -0.771*** -0.922*** -0.886*** -0.787*** -0.786*** -0.986*** -0.987*** -0.991*** -0.999*** 
 [0.171] [0.221] [0.223] [0.169] [0.169] [0.214] [0.215] [0.214] [0.214] 
AssetTurnover -0.141 -0.441** -0.463** -0.164 -0.16 -0.344** -0.350** -0.310** -0.351** 
 [0.125] [0.179] [0.180] [0.133] [0.132] [0.155] [0.156] [0.152] [0.156] 
M2B 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA -0.061** 0.244 0.241 -0.063** -0.064** -0.054* -0.054* -0.055** -0.055* 
 [0.028] [0.173] [0.180] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] 
SalesGrow -0.005 0.033 0.021 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.009] [0.036] [0.043] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Age -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
December -0.091 -0.254 -0.27 -0.083 -0.085 -0.169 -0.165 -0.145 -0.165 
 [0.209] [0.254] [0.255] [0.207] [0.207] [0.241] [0.242] [0.241] [0.241] 
Segments 0.025 0.035 0.009 0.046 0.045 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.015 
 [0.058] [0.083] [0.084] [0.058] [0.058] [0.075] [0.075] [0.076] [0.075] 
Constant -1.953*** -0.609 -1.062** -2.287*** -2.269*** -1.297** -1.281** -1.300** -1.148** 
 [0.396] [0.612] [0.536] [0.411] [0.414] [0.520] [0.518] [0.514] [0.488] 
          
Total Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
# of Treatment Obs. 420 246 246 420 420 282 282 282 282 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.649 0.654 0.662 0.616 0.614 0.634 0.632 0.645 0.634 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.036 0.044 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.030 0.035 0.030 
   
Table 5: Due Professional Care Allegation 
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"failure to exercise due professional care." Each column shows the regression results for a different audit quality 
measure, AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for output-based 
measures of audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures of audit quality. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are 
reported using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Output-based measures of audit quality      
DV: Due professional care 
allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure 0.072*** 0.060** 0.001 0.979*** -0.208 -0.05 -0.278 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.008] [0.179] [0.224] [0.126] [0.519] 
LogAT 0.075 0.075 0.073 0.038 0.043 0.038 -0.037 
 [0.080] [0.079] [0.079] [0.067] [0.066] [0.065] [0.085] 
Leverage -0.095 -0.098 -0.099 -0.04 -0.04 -0.048 -0.054 
 [0.084] [0.083] [0.084] [0.072] [0.075] [0.076] [0.074] 
Loss -0.710*** -0.719*** -0.723*** -0.720*** -0.767*** -0.698*** -0.789*** 
 [0.178] [0.178] [0.178] [0.166] [0.177] [0.176] [0.213] 
AssetTurnover -0.094 -0.096 -0.085 -0.108 -0.087 -0.074 -0.252* 
 [0.130] [0.129] [0.127] [0.134] [0.124] [0.122] [0.149] 
M2B 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ROA -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.076*** -0.071** -0.072*** -0.062** 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] 
SalesGrow -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.015] [0.012] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] 
Age -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.009 -0.014 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] 
December 0.058 0.054 0.063 -0.029 -0.104 -0.102 -0.126 
 [0.228] [0.227] [0.227] [0.230] [0.224] [0.225] [0.269] 
Segments 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.056 0.074 0.068 0.049 
 [0.069] [0.070] [0.069] [0.067] [0.064] [0.063] [0.084] 
Constant -2.786*** -2.796*** -2.780*** -2.953*** -2.479*** -2.478*** -1.624*** 
 [0.495] [0.496] [0.491] [0.444] [0.418] [0.411] [0.525] 
        
Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.616 0.614 0.614 0.675 0.607 0.606 0.62 
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.047 0.019 0.018 0.023 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality       
DV: Due 
professional care 
allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit Fee 
Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -0.832*** -0.601 0.747* 0.011 -0.12 0.423 0.262 -0.746*** -0.169 
 [0.272] [0.398] [0.439] [0.018] [0.232] [0.282] [0.290] [0.232] [0.215] 
LogAT 0.094 -0.099 -0.081 0.031 0.034 -0.051 -0.045 -0.012 -0.034 
 [0.066] [0.097] [0.093] [0.063] [0.065] [0.081] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] 
Leverage -0.062 0.374 0.32 -0.049 -0.051 -0.067 -0.064 -0.043 -0.063 
 [0.078] [0.254] [0.262] [0.077] [0.077] [0.074] [0.074] [0.072] [0.074] 
Loss -0.690*** -0.721*** -0.688*** -0.707*** -0.705*** -0.801*** -0.798*** -0.814*** -0.818*** 
 [0.170] [0.223] [0.228] [0.168] [0.168] [0.215] [0.215] [0.215] [0.213] 
AssetTurnover -0.059 -0.337** -0.345** -0.077 -0.073 -0.235 -0.244* -0.192 -0.246* 
 [0.116] [0.168] [0.173] [0.122] [0.121] [0.143] [0.146] [0.137] [0.146] 
M2B 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA -0.070** 0.211 0.201 -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.059** -0.059** -0.061** -0.060** 
 [0.027] [0.146] [0.151] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] 
SalesGrow -0.004 0.032 0.023 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.007] [0.037] [0.040] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Age -0.009 -0.021 -0.02 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 
 [0.009] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
December -0.109 -0.234 -0.252 -0.098 -0.1 -0.144 -0.131 -0.111 -0.139 
 [0.226] [0.289] [0.293] [0.225] [0.225] [0.268] [0.268] [0.268] [0.271] 
Segments 0.049 0.072 0.053 0.07 0.069 0.057 0.052 0.063 0.044 
 [0.065] [0.093] [0.092] [0.064] [0.064] [0.084] [0.083] [0.084] [0.084] 
Constant -1.503*** -0.284 -0.515 -1.729*** -1.708*** -0.781 -0.789 -0.777 -1.487*** 
 [0.406] [0.687] [0.568] [0.418] [0.418] [0.533] [0.527] [0.525] [0.511] 
          
Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.634 0.642 0.650 0.606 0.606 0.628 0.621 0.659 0.624 
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.031 0.032 0.018 0.018 0.027 0.024 0.036 0.023 
   
Table 6: Failure to Express an Appropriate Audit Opinion Allegation 
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"failure to express an appropriate audit opinion." Each column shows the regression results for a different audit 
quality measure, AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for output-
based measures of audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures of audit 
quality. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-
values are reported using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Output-based measures of audit quality      
DV: Appropriate audit 
opinion allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.004 1.064*** -0.05 -0.023 -0.247 
 [0.024] [0.022] [0.008] [0.186] [0.233] [0.130] [0.577] 
LogAT 0.105 0.106 0.102 0.074 0.072 0.071 0.004 
 [0.081] [0.081] [0.081] [0.062] [0.061] [0.061] [0.073] 
Leverage -0.045 -0.05 -0.049 -0.024 -0.031 -0.033 -0.059 
 [0.078] [0.077] [0.078] [0.076] [0.078] [0.079] [0.078] 
Loss -0.614*** -0.623*** -0.628*** -0.657*** -0.650*** -0.631*** -0.795*** 
 [0.185] [0.185] [0.185] [0.172] [0.187] [0.184] [0.221] 
AssetTurnover -0.206 -0.208 -0.192 -0.245 -0.199 -0.195 -0.484** 
 [0.161] [0.159] [0.157] [0.171] [0.156] [0.157] [0.209] 
M2B 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ROA -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.072** 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] 
SalesGrow -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 
 [0.010] [0.009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] 
December -0.193 -0.197 -0.184 -0.198 -0.275 -0.274 -0.416 
 [0.238] [0.239] [0.238] [0.232] [0.227] [0.227] [0.272] 
Segments 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.014 0.028 0.027 0.006 
 [0.074] [0.074] [0.074] [0.067] [0.064] [0.064] [0.085] 
Constant -2.839*** -2.852*** -2.825*** -3.169*** -2.664*** -2.661*** -1.732*** 
 [0.512] [0.512] [0.507] [0.472] [0.445] [0.439] [0.568] 
        
Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.619 0.618 0.617 0.685 0.618 0.618 0.628 
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.056 0.022 0.022 0.030 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality      
DV: 
Appropriate 
audit opinion 
allegation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit 
Fee Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -0.304 -0.721* 0.879 0.015 0.086 0.352 0.307 -0.766*** -0.26 
 [0.305] [0.402] [0.626] [0.019] [0.210] [0.308] [0.309] [0.242] [0.218] 
LogAT 0.088 -0.043 -0.026 0.064 0.071 -0.009 -0.006 0.029 0.008 
 [0.060] [0.083] [0.080] [0.059] [0.060] [0.072] [0.073] [0.072] [0.073] 
Leverage -0.038 0.333 0.255 -0.034 -0.032 -0.07 -0.069 -0.045 -0.067 
 [0.079] [0.299] [0.322] [0.079] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.079] [0.079] 
Loss -0.629*** -0.793*** -0.752*** -0.635*** -0.636*** -0.803*** -0.798*** -0.808*** -0.826*** 
 [0.176] [0.239] [0.240] [0.174] [0.174] [0.222] [0.224] [0.221] [0.220] 
AssetTurnover -0.187 -0.564** -0.582** -0.201 -0.195 -0.463** -0.471** -0.404** -0.477** 
 [0.154] [0.239] [0.236] [0.158] [0.157] [0.205] [0.204] [0.198] [0.205] 
M2B 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA -0.074*** 0.166 0.144 -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.070** -0.070** -0.071** -0.071** 
 [0.028] [0.167] [0.176] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
SalesGrow -0.001 0.055 0.044 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.002] [0.043] [0.053] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Age -0.003 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
December -0.275 -0.558* -0.586** -0.272 -0.274 -0.431 -0.416 -0.396 -0.429 
 [0.227] [0.290] [0.297] [0.226] [0.227] [0.273] [0.275] [0.274] [0.274] 
Segments 0.021 0.027 0.007 0.03 0.026 0.013 0.011 0.023 0.001 
 [0.063] [0.095] [0.092] [0.064] [0.064] [0.086] [0.085] [0.087] [0.085] 
Constant -2.526*** -0.923 -1.550*** -2.674*** -2.685*** -1.769*** -1.769*** -1.794*** -1.519*** 
 [0.457] [0.688] [0.597] [0.447] [0.448] [0.573] [0.569] [0.565] [0.534] 
          
Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.622 0.650 0.645 0.620 0.618 0.636 0.638 0.664 0.633 
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.039 0.041 0.023 0.022 0.033 0.033 0.044 0.031 
   
Table 7: Inadequate Planning and Supervision Violation 
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"Inadequate planning and supervision." Each column shows the regression results for a different audit quality measure, 
AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for output-based measures of 
audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures of audit quality. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are reported 
using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Output-based measures of audit quality      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DV: Inadequate planning 
and supervision violation DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure 0.037 -0.03 0.006 0.925*** -0.091 0.052 -0.516 
 [0.036] [0.059] [0.012] [0.186] [0.256] [0.136] [0.649] 
LogAT 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.031 0.034 0.029 -0.077 
 [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.082] [0.081] [0.080] [0.097] 
Leverage -0.468 -0.471 -0.468 0.096 0.064 0.049 0.167 
 [0.431] [0.432] [0.431] [0.212] [0.215] [0.239] [0.207] 
Loss -0.758*** -0.758*** -0.758*** -0.830*** -0.860*** -0.839*** -0.894*** 
 [0.201] [0.202] [0.202] [0.186] [0.203] [0.197] [0.226] 
AssetTurnover -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.187 -0.151 -0.144 -0.414** 
 [0.138] [0.138] [0.138] [0.175] [0.159] [0.161] [0.198] 
M2B 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ROA 0.011 0.01 0.011 0.117 0.068 0.071 0.163 
 [0.103] [0.100] [0.103] [0.199] [0.162] [0.166] [0.281] 
SalesGrow -0.029 -0.027 -0.033 -0.014 -0.019 -0.018 -0.022 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.035] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.029] 
Age -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.017 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.014] 
December -0.24 -0.238 -0.239 -0.298 -0.357 -0.354 -0.396 
 [0.249] [0.249] [0.249] [0.247] [0.244] [0.244] [0.283] 
Segments 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.044 0.057 0.054 0.047 
 [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.067] [0.065] [0.064] [0.080] 
Constant -2.455*** -2.445*** -2.454*** -2.801*** -2.380*** -2.409*** -1.154* 
 [0.579] [0.578] [0.579] [0.517] [0.495] [0.486] [0.595] 
        
Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.680 0.624 0.624 0.650 
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.050 0.025 0.025 0.036 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality 
DV: Inadequate 
planning and 
supervision violation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit Fee 
Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -1.104*** -0.755* 1.456*** -0.008 -0.159 0.563* 0.197 -0.624** -0.036 
 [0.291] [0.422] [0.482] [0.019] [0.251] [0.289] [0.309] [0.245] [0.236] 
LogAT 0.114 -0.116 -0.086 0.035 0.029 -0.096 -0.081 -0.052 -0.074 
 [0.079] [0.108] [0.100] [0.078] [0.080] [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.097] 
Leverage -0.01 0.316 0.219 0.05 0.053 0.128 0.147 0.147 0.152 
 [0.285] [0.282] [0.320] [0.238] [0.232] [0.205] [0.207] [0.208] [0.208] 
Loss -0.810*** -0.918*** -0.859*** -0.832*** -0.829*** -0.915*** -0.918*** -0.929*** -0.927*** 
 [0.192] [0.246] [0.249] [0.188] [0.188] [0.226] [0.228] [0.225] [0.226] 
AssetTurnover -0.113 -0.443** -0.475** -0.141 -0.144 -0.388** -0.404** -0.348* -0.405** 
 [0.149] [0.208] [0.209] [0.160] [0.161] [0.190] [0.193] [0.184] [0.194] 
M2B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA 0.055 0.196 0.18 0.068 0.068 0.164 0.17 0.162 0.171 
 [0.150] [0.172] [0.187] [0.164] [0.163] [0.245] [0.265] [0.269] [0.270] 
SalesGrow -0.023 -0.012 -0.027 -0.02 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 
 [0.020] [0.029] [0.028] [0.020] [0.019] [0.029] [0.029] [0.031] [0.030] 
Age -0.011 -0.025 -0.023 -0.01 -0.011 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 [0.010] [0.016] [0.016] [0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
December -0.368 -0.46 -0.494 -0.357 -0.355 -0.419 -0.409 -0.39 -0.419 
 [0.247] [0.301] [0.305] [0.245] [0.244] [0.282] [0.283] [0.283] [0.285] 
Segments 0.03 0.083 0.041 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.048 0.058 0.044 
 [0.065] [0.087] [0.085] [0.065] [0.065] [0.081] [0.080] [0.080] [0.081] 
Constant -2.006*** -0.35 -1.136* -2.381*** -2.362*** -1.235** -1.182** -1.206** -1.130* 
 [0.460] [0.666] [0.595] [0.497] [0.499] [0.605] [0.597] [0.591] [0.583] 
          
Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.666 0.664 0.685 0.623 0.625 0.664 0.649 0.664 0.648 
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.045 0.059 0.025 0.025 0.043 0.036 0.045 0.035 
   
Table 8: Independence Violation  
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"lack of independence from client." Each column shows the regression results for a different audit quality 
measure, AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for output-based 
measures of audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures of audit 
quality. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Standard-
errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are reported using ***, **, and *, representing significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
               
DV: Independent 
violation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure -0.002 -0.129 0.011 0.714*** -0.198 -0.091 -1.625 
 [0.043] [0.142] [0.014] [0.216] [0.270] [0.158] [1.293] 
LogAT 0.113 0.11 0.113 0.091 0.096 0.093 0.063 
 [0.092] [0.092] [0.092] [0.080] [0.079] [0.079] [0.097] 
Leverage -0.02 -0.024 -0.021 0.097 0.091 0.068 0.118 
 [0.266] [0.262] [0.266] [0.214] [0.214] [0.227] [0.216] 
Loss -0.436** -0.436** -0.435** -0.521*** -0.582*** -0.502** -0.620** 
 [0.209] [0.208] [0.209] [0.197] [0.216] [0.208] [0.268] 
AssetTurnover -0.23 -0.23 -0.231 -0.293 -0.278 -0.256 -0.532 
 [0.213] [0.213] [0.213] [0.237] [0.222] [0.225] [0.335] 
M2B 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.003** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
ROA 0.022 0.018 0.022 0.056 0.039 0.031 0.017 
 [0.156] [0.143] [0.157] [0.174] [0.142] [0.142] [0.150] 
SalesGrow -0.024 -0.019 -0.031 -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 
 [0.033] [0.031] [0.040] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026] [0.037] 
Age -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
December 0.027 0.027 0.028 -0.157 -0.209 -0.206 -0.184 
 [0.304] [0.304] [0.304] [0.293] [0.290] [0.290] [0.365] 
Segments 0.12 0.121 0.12 0.078 0.088 0.083 0.135 
 [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.071] [0.068] [0.068] [0.085] 
Constant -3.621*** -3.575*** -3.620*** -3.706*** -3.354*** -3.341*** -3.046*** 
 [0.654] [0.655] [0.655] [0.620] [0.584] [0.571] [0.800] 
        
Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.625 0.624 0.625 0.657 0.639 0.635 0.677 
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.042 0.028 0.028 0.046 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality 
DV: Independent 
violation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit 
Fee Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -0.566 -1.296** 0.585 0.02 -0.123 0.388 0.378 -0.397 -0.073 
 [0.381] [0.548] [0.593] [0.019] [0.237] [0.338] [0.331] [0.281] [0.276] 
LogAT 0.122 0.024 0.047 0.081 0.087 0.054 0.055 0.082 0.071 
 [0.076] [0.111] [0.106] [0.079] [0.078] [0.093] [0.094] [0.096] [0.097] 
Leverage 0.039 0.292 0.147 0.068 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.079 0.078 
 [0.235] [0.346] [0.404] [0.233] [0.232] [0.247] [0.248] [0.235] [0.255] 
Loss -0.504** -0.669** -0.619** -0.515*** -0.514*** -0.657** -0.652** -0.669** -0.673** 
 [0.201] [0.287] [0.302] [0.198] [0.198] [0.269] [0.271] [0.267] [0.266] 
AssetTurnover -0.236 -0.49 -0.483 -0.266 -0.256 -0.496 -0.502 -0.473 -0.515 
 [0.213] [0.350] [0.343] [0.227] [0.225] [0.322] [0.319] [0.319] [0.327] 
M2B 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002* 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA 0.029 0.131 0.071 0.036 0.034 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.029 
 [0.136] [0.201] [0.230] [0.149] [0.149] [0.143] [0.142] [0.139] [0.152] 
SalesGrow -0.02 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 -0.018 -0.019 
 [0.024] [0.040] [0.030] [0.022] [0.024] [0.037] [0.036] [0.039] [0.038] 
Age -0.002 -0.016 -0.014 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
December -0.204 -0.321 -0.348 -0.202 -0.203 -0.198 -0.182 -0.189 -0.211 
 [0.290] [0.379] [0.386] [0.289] [0.290] [0.363] [0.360] [0.364] [0.368] 
Segments 0.074 0.153 0.141 0.087 0.084 0.149* 0.145* 0.146* 0.132 
 [0.068] [0.094] [0.090] [0.069] [0.068] [0.087] [0.085] [0.087] [0.085] 
Constant -3.118*** -1.881** -2.888*** -3.383*** -3.357*** -3.141*** -3.143*** -3.113*** -3.020*** 
 [0.601] [0.950] [0.821] [0.580] [0.582] [0.796] [0.794] [0.784] [0.770]           
Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.645 0.680 0.672 0.635 0.635 0.669 0.672 0.679 0.668 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.049 0.039 0.029 0.028 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.041 
   
Table 9: Internal Control Violation 
This table presents the results of Model (1). The dependent variable equals one if there is an alleged violation of 
"failure to obtain an understanding of internal control." Each column shows the regression results for a different audit 
quality measure, AQ Measure, shown at the top of each column. Panel A presents the regression results for output-
based measures of audit quality. Panel B presents the regression results for input-based and other measures of audit 
quality. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Standard-errors 
are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are reported using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Output-based measures of audit quality     
DV: Internal 
control violation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DA AbsDA 
Total 
Accruals Rstmt SmlProfit SmlBeat GC 
AQ Measure 0.033 -0.108 0.005 1.074*** -0.046 -0.021 -0.545 
 [0.029] [0.119] [0.014] [0.204] [0.242] [0.159] [0.622] 
LogAT 0.146* 0.143* 0.145* 0.106* 0.101 0.1 0.05 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.087] [0.063] [0.062] [0.062] [0.071] 
Leverage -0.044 -0.041 -0.045 0.016 0.009 0.008 -0.022 
 [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.078] 
Loss -0.537** -0.540*** -0.540*** -0.616*** -0.608*** -0.589*** -0.761*** 
 [0.209] [0.209] [0.209] [0.184] [0.205] [0.201] [0.227] 
AssetTurnover -0.3 -0.3 -0.299 -0.420* -0.364* -0.359* -0.725** 
 [0.207] [0.208] [0.207] [0.228] [0.208] [0.211] [0.288] 
M2B 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
ROA -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.073** -0.066** -0.067** -0.072** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
SalesGrow -0.036 -0.028 -0.034 -0.01 -0.014 -0.014 -0.008 
 [0.040] [0.036] [0.043] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.030] 
Age -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] 
December -0.384 -0.385 -0.384 -0.342 -0.405* -0.405* -0.406 
 [0.262] [0.262] [0.262] [0.241] [0.239] [0.239] [0.275] 
Segments 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.064 0.073 0.071 0.052 
 [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.068] [0.065] [0.064] [0.080] 
Constant -3.193*** -3.149*** -3.189*** -3.472*** -2.944*** -2.942*** -2.129*** 
 [0.561] [0.557] [0.561] [0.502] [0.492] [0.485] [0.630] 
        
Observations 4279 4279 4279 5019 5019 5019 3252 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.632 0.632 0.631 0.706 0.652 0.651 0.665 
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.067 0.035 0.035 0.046 
   
Panel B: Input-based and other measures of audit quality 
DV: Internal 
control 
violation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BigN 
Audit 
Fee Ratio 
Audit Fee 
City Ratio Tenure 
New 
Client 
Top 20 
City 
Auditor 
Firm Diff 
City 
Specialist 
Industry 
Specialist 
AQ Measure -0.304 -1.337*** 0.179 0.015 -0.235 0.198 0.255 -0.565** -0.226 
 [0.361] [0.416] [0.655] [0.019] [0.262] [0.327] [0.321] [0.261] [0.234] 
LogAT 0.116* -0.049 -0.027 0.093 0.096 0.044 0.042 0.069 0.055 
 [0.060] [0.082] [0.080] [0.060] [0.061] [0.071] [0.073] [0.071] [0.071] 
Leverage 0.004 0.729** 0.630** 0.007 0.002 -0.032 -0.033 -0.013 -0.031 
 [0.081] [0.286] [0.270] [0.083] [0.084] [0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.076] 
Loss -0.586*** -0.703*** -0.659** -0.592*** -0.590*** -0.783*** -0.777*** -0.782*** -0.800*** 
 [0.189] [0.264] [0.271] [0.188] [0.188] [0.227] [0.228] [0.225] [0.225] 
AssetTurnover -0.347* -0.981*** -0.954*** -0.367* -0.358* -0.702** -0.703** -0.646** -0.713** 
 [0.208] [0.334] [0.329] [0.212] [0.212] [0.282] [0.280] [0.279] [0.282] 
M2B 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
ROA -0.065** 0.578 0.525 -0.066** -0.069** -0.065** -0.065** -0.066** -0.066** 
 [0.031] [0.573] [0.570] [0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
SalesGrow -0.015 0.005 0.006 -0.013 -0.014 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 
 [0.019] [0.033] [0.028] [0.017] [0.019] [0.028] [0.026] [0.029] [0.032] 
Age -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
December -0.404* -0.580** -0.604** -0.402* -0.403* -0.423 -0.41 -0.397 -0.425 
 [0.239] [0.289] [0.299] [0.238] [0.239] [0.277] [0.276] [0.277] [0.276] 
Segments 0.066 0.059 0.054 0.074 0.074 0.056 0.057 0.067 0.048 
 [0.065] [0.091] [0.092] [0.065] [0.065] [0.083] [0.081] [0.083] [0.081] 
Constant -2.803*** -0.676 -1.690** -2.956*** -2.914*** -2.167*** -2.178*** -2.200*** -1.956*** 
 [0.521] [0.732] [0.679] [0.491] [0.497] [0.632] [0.626] [0.625] [0.591] 
          
Observations 5019 2798 2798 5019 5019 3236 3236 3236 3236 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.654 0.703 0.68 0.653 0.652 0.663 0.669 0.679 0.664 
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.065 0.053 0.035 0.035 0.045 0.046 0.052 0.045 
   
Table 10: Predicting Specific Audit Deficiencies Using All AQ Measures 
This table presents the results of Model (1) when using combined regressions by including all the audit 
quality measures. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm 
level. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Model (5) does not include variables GC and Industry 
Specialist. This is because GC=0 and Industry Specialist=1 perfectly predicts independence violation. 
Therefore, Model (5) has lower number of observations. Associated p-values are reported using ***,**, and 
*, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Evidence DueCare Opinion Plan Indep IntControl 
DA 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.126*** -0.029 0.036 0.084* 
 [0.031] [0.032] [0.035] [0.051] [0.053] [0.044] 
Rstmt 1.301*** 1.474*** 1.670*** 1.021*** 1.603*** 1.762*** 
 [0.287] [0.305] [0.364] [0.297] [0.451] [0.406] 
SmlProfit -0.753** -0.835** -0.876*** -1.194*** -1.152*** -0.844** 
 [0.296] [0.328] [0.319] [0.414] [0.393] [0.334] 
SmlBeat 0.201 0.119 0.134 0.168 -0.073 0.058 
 [0.180] [0.185] [0.180] [0.198] [0.259] [0.229] 
GC -0.729 -0.328 0.063 -0.386  -1.279 
 [0.853] [0.685] [0.674] [0.851]  [1.201] 
BigN -1.543*** -1.571*** -0.488 -1.557*** -0.818 -0.693 
 [0.434] [0.436] [0.494] [0.484] [0.643] [0.554] 
Audit Fee Ratio -0.990** -0.886** -0.666 -1.378*** -1.583** -1.648*** 
 [0.398] [0.442] [0.443] [0.461] [0.666] [0.521] 
Audit Fee City Ratio 1.315* 0.832 1.481* 1.747** 0.871 0.855 
 [0.750] [0.644] [0.823] [0.732] [0.706] [0.861] 
Tenure 0.001 -0.023 0.014 -0.053** 0.024 0.017 
 [0.026] [0.024] [0.029] [0.026] [0.031] [0.026] 
New Client -1.035** -0.911** -0.391 -1.198*** -0.759 -0.587 
 [0.437] [0.397] [0.396] [0.400] [0.545] [0.416] 
Top 20 City 0.274 0.209 -0.16 0.679* -0.347 -0.268 
 [0.351] [0.382] [0.369] [0.383] [0.511] [0.437] 
Auditor Firm Diff 0.123 0.18 0.462 0.192 0.417 0.467 
 [0.358] [0.369] [0.352] [0.401] [0.497] [0.390] 
Industry Specialist 1.284* 1.123 1.191 1.594  1.795* 
 [0.737] [0.719] [0.738] [0.997]  [1.054] 
City Specialist -0.446* -0.628** -0.943*** -0.467* -0.535 -0.552* 
 [0.249] [0.260] [0.285] [0.277] [0.366] [0.324] 
Constant -1.778* -2.515** -3.243*** -1.499 -2.453** -3.111** 
 [1.008] [1.007] [1.061] [1.179] [1.165] [1.244] 
       
Observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2192 2377 
Cluster by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUC 0.797 0.785 0.791 0.825 0.783 0.803 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.178 0.16 0.214 0.168 0.155 
   
Table 11: Predicting Specific Audit Deficiencies Using Entropy Balanced Sample 
Panels A and B present descriptive statistics for control variables before and after applying entropy 
balancing method. Panel C replicates Table 10 using entropy balanced sample presented in Panel B of 
Table 11. All control variables are included in the model, but not reported in Panel C for brevity. 
Model (5) in Panel C does not include variables GC and Industry Specialist. This is because GC=0 and 
Industry Specialist=1 perfectly predicts independence violation. Therefore, Model (5) has lower 
number of observations.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are 
clustered at firm level. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are reported 
using ***, **, and *, representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics before Entropy Balancing 
  Treat Sample (N=195) Control Sample (N=2182) 
Difference in 
means 
  Mean  Variance Mean  Variance p-value 
LogAT 6.095 5.293 6.527 4.176 0.005 
Leverage 0.460 0.085 0.513 0.508 0.304 
Loss 0.308 0.214 0.430 0.245 0.001 
AssetTurnover 0.891 0.401 0.965 0.705 0.231 
M2B 3.893 17.510 3.771 983.600 0.957 
ROA -0.061 0.274 -0.150 1.787 0.358 
SalesGrow 0.585 6.085 0.339 2.308 0.042 
Age 21.810 283.500 25.680 282.600 0.002 
December 0.672 0.222 0.678 0.218 0.853 
Segments 2.026 2.118 2.109 2.237 0.457 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics after Entropy Balancing 
  Treat Sample (N=195) Control Sample (N=2182) 
Difference in 
means 
  Mean  Variance Mean  Variance p-value 
LogAT 6.095 5.293 6.095 3.464 0.999 
Leverage 0.460 0.085 0.460 0.184 0.995 
Loss 0.308 0.214 0.308 0.213 1.000 
AssetTurnover 0.891 0.401 0.891 0.424 1.000 
M2B 3.893 17.510 3.893 1285.000 1.000 
ROA -0.061 0.274 -0.062 0.309 0.994 
SalesGrow 0.585 6.085 0.585 10.160 1.000 
Age 21.810 283.500 21.810 186.300 1.000 
December 0.672 0.222 0.672 0.221 1.000 
Segments 2.026 2.118 2.026 2.103 1.000 
 
   
Panel C: Predicting specific audit deficiencies using entropy balanced sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Evidence Due Care Opinion Planning Independence IntControl 
DA 0.105*** 0.122** 0.140*** -0.082 0.053 0.085* 
 [0.037] [0.050] [0.040] [0.086] [0.034] [0.048] 
Rstmt 1.347*** 1.512*** 1.701*** 0.969*** 1.357*** 1.584*** 
 [0.207] [0.234] [0.246] [0.241] [0.342] [0.281] 
SmlProfit -0.704** -0.802** -0.971*** -0.987** -1.200*** -0.885** 
 [0.317] [0.324] [0.337] [0.433] [0.383] [0.349] 
SmlBeat 0.295 0.097 0.147 0.163 -0.08 0.141 
 [0.208] [0.215] [0.221] [0.236] [0.276] [0.249] 
GC -0.63 -0.134 0.526 -0.217  -0.888 
 [0.748] [0.674] [0.731] [0.651]  [1.116] 
BigN -1.301*** -1.202*** 0.555 -1.137*** 0.116 -0.106 
 [0.331] [0.362] [0.351] [0.395] [0.495] [0.391] 
Audit Fee Ratio -1.269** -0.455 0.01 -1.907*** -1.551** -1.803*** 
 [0.542] [0.493] [0.520] [0.565] [0.641] [0.552] 
Audit Fee City Ratio 1.363*** 0.585 1.493*** 1.812*** 0.522 0.355 
 [0.425] [0.498] [0.500] [0.425] [0.520] [0.582] 
Tenure 0.011 -0.039** 0.019 -0.068*** 0.013 0.018 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022] 
New Client -0.971** -1.052** -0.398 -1.217** -0.903 -0.514 
 [0.445] [0.418] [0.387] [0.504] [0.651] [0.488] 
Top 20 City 0.441* 0.169 -0.417* 0.999*** -0.499 -0.434 
 [0.253] [0.239] [0.242] [0.277] [0.364] [0.284] 
Auditor Firm Diff 0.146 0.245 0.713*** 0.301 0.451 0.540** 
 [0.228] [0.225] [0.226] [0.273] [0.317] [0.261] 
Industry Specialist 0.97 0.605 0.848 1.359  1.342 
 [0.810] [0.817] [0.802] [0.938]  [1.146] 
City Specialist -0.371* -0.726*** -1.182*** -0.454* -0.508* -0.437* 
 [0.213] [0.225] [0.261] [0.236] [0.287] [0.262] 
Constant 1.001 -0.252 -1.166* 1.625** -1.611* -0.03 
 [0.662] [0.637] [0.677] [0.692] [0.830] [0.772] 
       
Observations 2,377 2,377 2,377 2,377 2,192 2,377 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F Stat 3.45 2.53 3.67 3.018 2.28 2.639 
   
Table 12: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
This table presents results for seemingly unrelated regressions that use the top 6 most cited audit 
violations as dependent variables. The independent variables include all the audit quality measures and 
control variables. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard-errors are clustered at firm 
level. Standard-errors are clustered at firm level. Associated p-values are reported using ***, **, and *, 
representing significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Evidence DueCare Opinion Plan Indep IntControl 
DA 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Rstmt 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 
 [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] 
SmlProfit -0.03** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02** 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.013] 
SmlBeat 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.006 -0.00 0.001 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] 
GC -0.04* -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03* -0.02 
 [0.027] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.020] [0.022] 
BigN -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.02 -0.08*** -0.02* -0.02* 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.012] [0.013] 
Audit Fee Ratio -0.05*** -0.05** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
 [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.017] 
Audit Fee City Ratio 0.095*** 0.054** 0.081*** 0.126*** 0.034* 0.029 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019] [0.021] 
Tenure -0.00 -0.00 0.000 -0.00** 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
New Client -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01 -0.02 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.014] 
Top 20 City 0.013 0.009 -0.00 0.031** -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] 
Auditor Firm Diff 0.001 0.006 0.018 0.001 0.013 0.018 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] 
Industry Specialist 0.048* 0.041* 0.042* 0.044* 0.037** 0.041* 
 [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019] [0.021] 
City Specialist -0.02** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.01** -0.02*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] 
Constant 0.184*** 0.132*** 0.070* 0.187*** 0.040 0.089*** 
 [0.039] [0.038] [0.036] [0.035] [0.029] [0.032] 
       
Observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 8.25 6.91 5.94 8.37 3.99 4.63 
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.066 0.057 0.079 0.039 0.045 
 
